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Introduction
The formation and subsequent actions of the Nazi government left a devastating and
indelible impact on Europe and the world. In the midst of general technological and social
progress that has occurred in Europe since the Enlightenment, the Nazis represent one of the
greatest social regressions that has occurred in the modern world. Despite the development of a
generally more humanitarian and socially progressive conditions in the western world over the
past several hundred years, the Nazis instigated one of the most diabolic and genocidal programs
known to man. And they did so using modern technologies in an expression of what historian
Jeffrey Herf calls “reactionary modernism.” The idea, according to Herf is that, “Before and after
the Nazi seizure of power, an important current within conservative and subsequently Nazi
ideology was a reconciliation between the antimodernist, romantic, and irrantionalist ideas
present in German nationalism and the most obvious manifestation of means ...modern
technology.”1 Nazi crimes were so extreme and barbaric precisely because they incorporated
modern technologies into a process that violated modern ethical standards.
Nazi crimes in the context of contemporary notions of ethics are almost inconceivable.
Prominent literary critic and European intellectual George Steiner in reference to the
development of extermination camps in German-occupied Poland in his book In Bluebeard’s
Castle he says, “In locating Hell above ground, we have passed out of the major orders and
symmetries of Western civilization.”2 He elaborates, claiming that after the mass murder that
occurred during the Holocaust, the eschatological and utopic visions that humans have so long
valued have become hollow and devoid of meaning and “through which Western consciousness
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is forced to experience the blackmail of transcendence.”3 The Nazi secularization of the
religiously utopic vision initially perpetuated by Judeo-Christian religions created a need within
Nazi ideology to rid itself of the “bad conscience” it associated with Western Life and more
specifically the Jews who had created an infinite, unknowable, and always disappointed God.
According to Steiner, the Nazis lashed out against what they believed to be the holdover
religious impulses that had up until that point placed moral restrictions on their actions, thereby
overcoming the idea of a transcendent morality or set of ethics.
German philosopher and intellectual Jürgen Habermas has dedicated his life to exploring
the means by which to overcome such destruction. Although humans have experienced almost
unimpeded technological progress since the medieval period, the Nazis reflect a devastating
lapse in social progress and for some indicate the arbitrariness of various ethical and moral
standards. This no doubt impacted a young Habermas who was a teenager in Germany during
World War II. He claims, “It was the events of the year 1945 that set my political motives.”4
Habermas like other Germans was devastated by how Germany engaged in systematic murder.
On a more personal level, as a philosophy student at Göttingen, Zurich, and Bonn he was
perturbed how German intellectuals, particularly Martin Heidegger, were complicit buttressing
the regime.5 The idea that intellectuals who had dedicated themselves to searching for a means
for human liberation and meaning had supported the actions of a barbaric regime undermined the
idea that progress could be made in the social sciences. To overcome this problem, Habermas
dedicated himself to conceiving a theoretical framework that could help people understand how
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human progress was inextricably connected with using our capacity as social beings to come to
terms with one another in a process of mutual betterment.
To understand Habermas’s problematic relationship with the Third Reich, one must
examine its foundation. Habermas and others could point out how the Nazi government was
shrouded in quasi-legality. Although the regime was a totalitarian dictatorship, it still presented
itself as if it upheld the law and provided justice to its citizens. An analysis of its structure in
chapter one will undermine this idea. The fact is that under Hitler, there was little true dialogue.
Hitler’s claim to power was absolute and his decision final. In an attempt to legitimate this
authority, Hitler used false facts and details, particularly against Jews, to emphasize the necessity
that German citizens accept his absolute leadership as the only means by which to fight these
exaggerated threats. He did so regardless of the military, economic, and social implications of his
actions, forcing the retirement of military commanders because their better-informed ideas ran
contrary to his own or forcing the retirement of Economics Minister Hjalmar Schacht because he
opposed Hitler’s extreme militarism. Similarly, he was ruthless towards his opponents, at times
promoting infighting amongst his subordinates and in more extreme instances, ordering
executions or that military commanders retire as a means to ensure his own supremacy against
outside political threats.
Similarly, the courts under Hitler lost all semblance of actual legality. Although
traditionally expected to promote justice, during the Weimar Republic and later under Hitler they
became primarily a vehicle through which to promote Nazi policy. Even before Hitler came to
power, conservative courts issued notoriously light sentences to Nazi criminals who often
persecuted communists and other political groups. In this way, the Nazis, although a bellicose
and often violent organization, were able to remain a viable political party during the 1920s until
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they came to power in 1933. Moreover, once they did come to power, legal scholars and
academics overlooked traditional notions of judicial objectivity as they provided justification for
the courts to issue decisions that promoted ambiguous notions of a healthy Volk community as
determined by Nazis. They gave the courts broad leeway to interpret decisions in the interests of
National Socialism over the already explicitly formulated statues meant to promote individual
freedom and justice. The courts became specifically identified with Hitler and the Nazi
community and decided some of the most important cases in the interests of the Führer and the
German völkish community, overruling civil liberties.
Particularly for Habermas, one must acknowledge that these democratically illegitimate
policies implemented by the Nazis during the Third Reich have had subsequent implications on
German society. Punishments for Nazis have often been curtailed and mitigated by subsequent
governments, particularly by the parliament led by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. In the interest
of overcoming the Nazi past, Adenauer’s government was particularly influential in passing
many amnesties for many former Nazis. This has arguably led to an overlooking of some of the
nefarious Nazi foundations of new German law. It neglected to remove from office morally
corrupted individuals who were complicit in Nazi crimes. Similarly, certain statues and laws
implemented by the Nazis, despite being discriminatory and overly vague, remained in effect
well after the end of the Third Reich. Habermas believes that in order to overcome these
pernicious consequences, Germans must develop a more novel constitutionally-based society
incorporating social contract ideas from the western world and avoid attempting to continue a
hermeneutic tradition whereby Germans continue to promote their unique cultural traditions
sometimes over the interests of formulating more specific governmental procedural processes.
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That is why Habermas has vocally expressed his reservations about conservative
historians who, starting in the 1960s and 1970s, began gradually to contextualize the formation
and actions of the Third Reich. He was particularly resistant to theoreticians like Ernst Nolte,
who compared the type of fascism that developed in Nazi Germany to what had previously come
to fruition in Italy and France, and to Joachim Fest, who compared the atrocities committed
during the Holocaust to the killings carried out by the Soviets. Nolte went further to develop
theories on totalitarianism whereby he linked the Third Reich and the Stalinist regime. Habermas
was further opposed to more general theories about Germany’s place within the broader
European political sphere, such as Andreas Hillgruber’s ideas about Germany as a land in the
middle. Habermas believed that all told these theories did not lay the foundations for a new,
more constitutionally grounded state based on the notion of human dignity and instead attempted
to make excuses for German actions during WWII, which would be detrimental in an effort to
overcome the systematic distortions that occurred during the Third Reich.
Ultimately, his goal has been to protect the integrity of mankind. The Holocaust, for
Habermas, is indicative of a total breakdown in the acknowledgement of humankind as a social
species that benefits the most when it respects the inherent worth of others. Respecting alterity is
fundamental for Habermas in that it preserves the greatest amount of potential knowledge upon
which a society can draw. All human beings by engaging in fair and legitimate dialogue can
cooperatively improve their collective condition. Respect for human dignity is inextricably
connected with human progress.
Of course, it is necessary then to establish why human dignity is so fundamental.
Although contemporary western societies might take it for granted that there is inherent value in
all human lives, this was not necessarily the case in Nazi Germany. Often times, those outside
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the “Aryan” race where characterized as sub-human and therefore unworthy of respect. Their
inferior racial characteristics meant that they could be brutalized and murdered. In Habermas’s
most well known book series and the basis of the second chapter, The Theory of Communicative
Action, he establishes why it is so fundamental that all human life be respected. He analyses why
there is an inherent worth to all human life, regardless of class, racial characteristics, or
otherwise. He creates a foundation of human worth based on the notion that all people can
contribute unique perspectives through dialogue that regardless of origin always contributes to a
general elevation of human rationality and progress when not inhibited by stigmatizing and
stratifying influences.
Habermas believes people engage in a “lifeworld” in that we are social creatures who
must come to terms with other rationalities outside of our own through language. The lifeworld,
according to Habermas, is inherently improved by incorporating understanding or the ability to
integrate outside human influences into a specific perspective and outlook. The more
understanding one achieves, the better that person is able to go about problem-solving and
reconciling himself/herself to his/her changing circumstances. These normative influences are of
fundamental importance. Although it is important that humans develop various technical and
social procedures in order to deal with the material and personal situations they encounter, they
must also be adaptable and recognize when certain processes are flawed or stagnant. To do so,
they require a solid normative foundation, one by which they are positively influenced by all of
the accumulated rationality of their peers. They must reach beyond their own, overly formulaic
understanding to achieve social and individual progress.
These are the dictates of reason that were violated by Nazi leaders. Nazi leaders refused
to integrate the perspectives of outsiders into their own, limited understanding. Furthermore, they
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created an incredibly regimented and hierarchical society in order to prevent empathetic and
critical dialogue that consolidated the power of the few at the expense of the many. Individuals
strategically and opportunistically protected their own arbitrary spheres of influence at the
expense of achieving more legitimate personal and social progress. They increased their power
within a contrived political sphere rather than striving for a more general form of human
emancipation.
All of these actions weakened the power of “communicative action.” They disallowed
people from understanding themselves as communicative actors who can argue, evaluate, and
self-reflect. This was detrimental to a process of individuation whereby individuals, though
engaging communally, begin to better understand their own capacity to contribute to their
communities. People, because they were oppressed, manipulated, and controlled by the Nazi
state and party were weakened as communicative actors in their abilities to learn. This
contributed to an already pernicious general reduction of rationality that occurred during the
Third Reich.
Habermas believes that an unfortunate consequence of World War II was that it
encouraged many postmodern and poststructuralist thinkers to abandon reason’s emancipatory
potential. Because the Nazis used reason so destructively, these thinkers forget how helpful
reason can be in achieving social progress, and instead believe more in the relativism of value.
Although this might be an overgeneralization, what is consistently true of thinkers such as
Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida is that they deny a transcendent or quasi-transcendent
foundation of values or norms. They reject the idea that humans are in some fundamental way
united by the same interest. Habermas, on the other hand, believes that they are. Chapter three,
based on Habermas’s book Knowledge and Other Interests, examines how human social
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progress, according to Habermas, should be associated with the general ability of mankind to use
its knowledge to fulfill its interests to emancipate it socially from antagonism and violence.
Habermas grounds this idea in German intellectual tradition and particularly among the
three thinkers who have most influenced him, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Hegel, and Karl Marx.
In Kant, Habermas finds the philosopher most responsible for the establishment of a transcendent
ethic that acknowledges the categorical imperative that one should consider whether his or her
actions if pursued by everyone would be beneficial. This idea is consistent with Habermas’s
theory that respect for the alterity of others is of fundamental importance. However, Habermas,
like Hegel believes that Kant may apply his theory a little too generally and that it should also
have a dialectical basis, by which one responds to one’s circumstances and cultivates new ideas
in a critical way. Kant does not significantly incorporate an idea of change and gradual
modernization through self-critique, a concept that Hegel rightly recognizes as critical in the
process of human progress. However, Hegel is overly idealistic in his own right. He focuses too
much on how thought shapes reality and neglects material conditions. At this point, Marx rightly
steps in and reminds us that higher levels of human achievement and progress should correctly
be associated with humans using their collective reasoning capacity to respond to changes in
their material environments pragmatically. One must acknowledge the realities of one’s
circumstances before one can go about coordinating with others.
Habermas believes that the best ideas introduced by these thinkers were all fundamentally
violated by those in power under during the Third Reich. Nazi officials certainly failed to respect
the alterity of the Jews. Rather than communicating openly they persecuted them ruthlessly,
without regard or consideration of their point of view. Similarly, the Nazis in some basic ways
were also overly idealistic. They expected to be able to achieve a grand empire based on notions
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of historical destiny rather than practical and material conditions. In every way conceivable, the
Nazis spread themselves too thin, fighting a major two front war, spending far too much time
developing grandiose plans, and consistently not acknowledging the realities of their gradual
downfall during the Second World War. Moreover, instead of taking account of these material
and pragmatic realities, they diverted attention to a false enemy, the Jews. Jews increasingly
became the scapegoats for Nazi failures and were systematically murdered largely as a result of
opportunistic attempts by major Nazis to secure their own source of power in an increasingly
antagonistic struggle for power among incompetent and overzealous Nazi ideologues.
Increasingly, the Nazi leaders by fighting strategically amongst one another lost the ability for
self-reflection. They failed to recognize and appropriately respond to their military, scientific,
and social inadequacies because they were too preoccupied with protecting and expanding their
own spheres of influence against the more general collective interests of the German empire and
people.
Habermas also takes from the German intellectual tradition a strong belief in the notion
that all human acts involve interest. This means that human behavior is not arbitrary. Rather, all
action is purposive based on learned behaviors and a given set of expectations. He believes, like
German intellectual Wilhelm Dilthey, that human behavior is a process by which the past is
processed reflexively in preparation for the future. Human behavior is interested in the sense that
it is always volitional and goal-oriented. For this reason, it is of fundamental importance that
people recognize the importance of Freud’s model of self-reflection. Without self-critique people
may become overly immersed in a negative paradigm through which they inappropriately justify
actions based on false expectations and misdirected goals.

9

This was certainly the case in the Third Reich where the Führer’s will became
increasingly distinct from the will of his people. Although he was supposed to embody and
express the desires of his people, he became increasingly willing to sacrifice them in
maintenance of his supreme command. Without himself as Leader, Hitler believed, Germany
would invariably collapse. His actions became so solipsistic that he was completely unable to
integrate any outside influence that could redirect his actions or elicit any real, intersubjectively
based self-criticism. This of course had far reaching implications not only through Hitler’s direct
actions but also those of his subordinates who were expected to appeal only to his authority and
thereby also lacked an ability to redirect themselves or engage in self-criticism in any way that
they believed might not appeal directly to Hitler.
This certainly led to general flaws in the German governmental structure. In chapter four
addresses Habermas’s book In Between Facts and Norms where Habermas explains his theories
regarding how to go about reconciling the normative and procedurally prescriptive aspects of a
governmental system. He establishes a platform on which a constitutionally established
government can build legislative, executive, and judicial processes all the while maintaining their
basis in the communicative and validating power of the general citizenry. It addresses the notion
of a background understanding in which people regard each other as participants in a system that
exceeds their individual contribution but which they in turn can learn to inculcate within their
own perspective through dialogue. Habermas strongly reiterates his belief that universal
participation is necessary to legitimate this process.
The Nazis were shown to have violated this normative foundation. Nazi leaders
imperiously imposed legislation and ideology on their citizens without necessarily including
them in dialogue or openly and honestly seeking their input regarding Hitler’s plans. Implicitly,
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this took away citizens’ abilities to feel like they could determine their own destinies and futures.
It created a circumstance whereby they constantly feared the regime and complied largely based
on misinformation, opportunism, and lack of other options. It also meant that their fates were
inextricably bound with Hitler’s. His decisions would determine their futures and his demise
would seal the downfall of the Third Reich.

11

The Creation and Consequences of the Third Reich
Hitler
The total destruction of viable political and judicial communication that resulted during
the Third Reich can be most appropriately attributed to Adolf Hitler and the rise of the Nazi
Party. Hitler’s solipsism and egomania stand in contradistinction to Habermas’s theory of the
progression of society based on the development of reason through legitimate intersubjective
communication.
From Hitler’s rise to absolute leader within the Nazi Party, to his takeover of political
power, and eventual totalitarian control of the military, economy, and all other major sectors of
the German state, he displayed the incapacity to use reasoned, well substantiated arguments that
were open to refutation and the input of others. Rather, he used vitriolic and reactionary
propaganda to manipulate a very large number of discontented German citizens and direct their
resentment towards Communists and Jews, easy targets as a result of underlying German
antagonisms to both groups. As he gained influence in the Party he became increasingly less
susceptible to criticism. As his star power as a great orator rose, so did the impenetrability of his
image as an absolute leader. By using violence to consolidate power, his actions were strategic
rather than communicative. And by brewing resentments between his various underlings and
emphasizing his absolute authority to make all decisions he created a network of sycophants and
connivers who became incapable of substantial dialogue and amenable to insidious attempts at
gaining power. In this manner Hitler and his government embodied the rise of a dictator, an
event Habermas has spent his career trying to prevent from ever happening again.
Beginning as a reactionary politician during the Weimar Republic, Hitler gradually
ascended to total control of the newly emerging Nazi Party. He did so strategically, winning over
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crowds with raucous speeches that gave them an outlet to vent their frustrations. And although he
began to attract larger crowds he received increasingly less outside input that challenged his
opinions. Rather, he deliberately refrained from gaining real insights into the failings of Germans
and society. Instead of gathering facts he made radical announcements declaring threats based on
blatantly false evidence. One technique he used quite frequently was grossly exaggerating the
influence of Jewish people in Germany. Whereas Jews made up only 0.76 percent of the
population in Germany, Hitler overestimated their prevalence in Germany society that insisted
that they dominated business, the arts, and the bureaucracy.6 He was particularly keen on
emphasizing their dominance of the Civil Service, claiming in 1933 that they filled 62 percent of
all its positions. The reality was that Jews were in fact underrepresented in the Civil Service,
filling a mere 0.16 percent of positions.7 He therefore stimulated increased suspicion and
resentments towards Jews among those fearing the domination of German governmental
positions by non-Aryans. Instead of using claims that could be substantiated against the objects
of an interlocutor, he used patently false claims to manipulate an audience and gain their
attention.
Hitler could thus begin making the larger and more grandiose threats of a Jewish
Bolshevik threat to the East in the Soviet Union that aspired to appropriate Germany and
subjugate its subjects. By using his previously false but largely non-refuted claims regarding the
increasing control of Jews in Germany, he could perpetuate the grander accusation of a great
Jewish Communist conspiracy against “Aryan Germans.” This therefore allowed him to feed off
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of resentments and argue for a preemptive strike, to appropriate power in Germany from Jewish
interests and begin a campaign for Lebensraum or “living space” towards the East.8
Hitler, in his book, Mein Kampf, is particularly offensive towards Jews and their value to
their society. He makes the patently false claim that they are primarily self-involved and have no
respect for one another. Rather, according to Hitler, the Jewish…readiness for sacrifice does not
extend beyond the simple instinct of individual preservation. In their case the feeling of racial
solidarity which they apparently manifest is nothing but a primitive gregarious instinct.”9
Thereby, Jews, in Hitler’s mind, are a lower life form. They do not exhibit love for their
brethren, a feeling of strong empathy that Hitler reserves almost entirely only for “Aryans.”
Hitler dehumanizes Jews by disassociating them from the normal spectrum of human emotions.
Hitler, in his rise to power, was also particularly cruel to members of the Left. Rather
than taking their arguments seriously, weighing what they had to say and letting that influence
his policy, he violently lashed out against them, using the paramilitary Sturmabteilung (SA) and
Schutzstaffel (SS) to intimidate and destroy opposition. He violated all notions of genuine
consensus and understanding when he had members of the Sozialdemokratische Partei
Deutschlands (SPD) coerced and beaten by the SA on May 2, 1933 and following days. Their
offices were occupied, their funds confiscated, and their internal infrastructure destroyed,
dismantling the largest trade union in the world and reincorporating it into the German Labor
Front, an organization for all intents and purposes under Hitler's total control.10 Consequently, he
destroyed opportunities for workers to unite in solidarity by forcefully incorporating them into a
state-led organization that autocratically dictated their assignments and priorities.

8

Kershaw, Hitler, 249.
Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf, (Bottom of the Hill, 2010), 259.
10
Kershaw, Hitler, 476-77.

9

14

Similarly, instead of allowing himself to be influenced by the arguments and influences
of others, he ruthlessly weeded out any members of his own Party who he thought might
represent any challenge to his total control. After being appointed German Chancellor by then
President Paul von Hindenburg, Hitler purged the government of elements that might have
challenged his authoritarian control. As one of his first pieces of legislation he pushed for the
passing of an Enabling Law that would allow the cabinet, which was basically under Hitler's
control, to make law without approval of the Reichstag. And without the votes of the 81
members of the Communist Party, who had been persecuted and banned as a result of the Nazis
and a right wing coalition, the Reichstag overwhelming approved the measure, 441-94, thereby
effectively voting for its own its own dismemberment.
In addition to appropriating the power of the national parliament, Hitler, after being
named Chancellor, took the opportunity to undo traditional state authority, passing the “Second
Law for the Coordination of the Reich” under which Nazi or Nazi-controlled authorities were to
be named Reich governors of individual states, thereby undermining their authority and allowing
for the eventual abolition of the autonomy of the Länder that occurred in 1934.11
Hitler was also unafraid to take deadly measures to weed out opponents and increase his
own control at the expense of other factions of his own party. One of his most aggressive moves
was to order a series of political murders carried out between June 30 and July 2, 1934 known as
the Night of Long Knives. This included the killing of several prominent political figures
including former Chancellor Kurt von Schleicher and Gregor Stasser, a former leader of the Nazi
left. Moreover, Hitler’s SS henchmen eliminated the leader of the SA, Ernst Röhm, and many of
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his associates to greatly weaken the SA and further consolidate all military and police control in
Hitler’s hands.12
Despite the severity of these actions, however, his crimes went largely unchallenged and
received praise from leaders of government and the military. Rather than condemning a violent
and unilateral action taken without recourse to legal and diplomatic channels, state and army
officials praised Hitler in a show of dedication to his regime and totalitarian control. Defense
Minister Werner von Blomberg issued a statement praising the Night of Long Knives actions as
“soldierly determination and exemplary courage, shown by the Führer in attacking and crushing
traitors and mutineers.”13 Similarly, members of the Reichstag showed their increasing inability
to challenge Hitler by cheering the speech he gave on July 13 describing how mutinies are
broken by “eternal, iron laws,” despite the fact that they had lost thirteen of their members in the
Night of the Long Knives. Perhaps most important conciliation was that of Reich President
Hindenburg who sent a letter to Hitler conveying his “deep-felt gratitude” for an action that had
“rescued the German from a serious danger.”14 This indicated not only Hindenburg’s
unwillingness to challenge Hitler’s insatiable quest for power but also, perhaps, his own physical
and mental deterioration that would shortly end in his death and the rise of Hitler as supreme
ruler in Germany.
Unfortunately for the German people, Hitler's despotic control extended into all other
major sectors of the state as well the economy and the military. Whenever the guidance of
experts or professionals conflicted with Hitler's propaganda, he always exerted his authority
regardless of any implications it had on the industry's ability to grow. Hitler's policies initially
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worked to the benefit of financiers and large corporations. The idea of "working towards the
Führer” stimulated the growth of industrial giants like Mannesmann and Krupp and chemical
giants like IG Farben in preparation for war and the extension of the German state. Additionally,
German companies benefited from the exploitation of Jews that Hitler perpetuated in the name of
"making the whole of Jewry responsible for all damage inflicted by individual specimens of this
community of criminals upon the German economy," and the confiscation of Jewish property
under the auspices of the Lebensraum program.15 Particularly insidious were the banks, including
Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank that were able to exploit persecuted Jews forced to sell off
their assets at minimal costs.16 Much of Hitler's initial success was contingent upon the
development of a war industry and the violent exploitation of Jews, policies that while allowing
for short term benefits were unsustainable under Hitler's unilaterally developed imperialist
policies.
The inability of Germany to sustain its economy under Hitler is evidenced by the 1942
food crisis at a time in which the Germans had just experienced failures on the Eastern Front.
Food distribution, which was unorganized and incompetently managed, could not be effectively
dealt with because Hitler and his cronies refused to look at the problem pragmatically and with
the help of others. Rather, they chose to relegate blame: Hitler blamed transport and Goebbels
attacked the judicial system.17 They effectively subsumed the interests of the economy for the
purposes of propaganda. They unilaterally perpetuated their own strategic gains at the expense of
the German people.
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This level of control of all components of the state meant that as Germany's prospects of
winning the war became increasingly less propitious, so did the German people's chances of
extricating themselves from Hitler's suicidal plan for world domination. Without Hitler, the
country could not move. Politically, economically, and militarily the country was following a
Führer who isolated himself from those around him. Without any real prospects of opposition,
Hitler diminished his propaganda campaign and appeared publicly in person far less often. While
he had given innumerable speeches on his rise to power, he gave only two public speeches in
1943 and was largely inaccessible at his Field Headquarters in East Prussia or his mountain
retreat in Berchtesgaden.18
Rather than looking to others to attempt to find a solution or at least mitigate the
devastating effects of the war, he attributed Germany's declining prospects to the incompetence
of his advisors and the lack of conviction of the German people. The fate of millions around the
world became tied to his selfish notion that he was a visionary, and those who did not fulfill his
expectations were only worthy of destruction and misery.19 Rather than normatively justifying
the aims of his people, he took complete responsibility for their fate, associating their failure to
live up to his expectations with a fundamental flaw in character.

Courts
Like parliament and the police forces, the judges also bowed to Hitler’s will. Rather than
normatively justifying their decisions, they acceded to Hitler's authority. This meant they could
manipulate the language of the law and implement vaguely justified decisions as long as they
produced the results that Hitler wanted. Rather than serving as a beacon of justice, arbitrating
18
19
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between the state and the people, the courts were used by the government as a device of
exploitation and terror. Penalties for political dissidents were severely increased, as were
decisions regarding those who Hitler considered to be sub-standard citizens, including the
mentally handicapped and political dissidents. And like the rhetoric of Hitler's government in
general, the most vitriolic condemnations fell on the Jews who were viciously persecuted by the
courts in some of the most anti-Semitic decisions ever produced. This reserved the theoretical
positions of the court as a legitimate deliverer of justice. Rather than review cases objectively,
the court was a vehicle for Hitler to weed out those he viewed as his opponents and protect those
he liked. Decisions regarding crimes committed by Nazis were notoriously light and benign.
Conversely, decisions regarding political dissidents and Jews were incredibly severe. The court
lost all semblance of legitimacy; justice was no longer delivered based on intersubjectively valid
principles but on Hitler's solitary and homicidal positions.
As the Nazis rose to power in Germany, so did legal decisions consistent with their
policies. One such important measure taken was establishing precedent to defend crimes
committed by those who identified with the national system. Early on a county judge named
Dietrich was influential in arguing that "national aim" should play an important role in
addressing the culpability of those committing violent offenses.20 He thereby called for the
mitigation of violent Nazi crimes committed against Communists and others as long as the
perpetrators were committed to a strong rightist sense of nationalism. This influence only grew
until Communists were eventually found guilty of attempting to undo the "existing constitution
of the Reich" and outlawed in July 1933.21
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Legal professors and scholars opportunistically justified the political appropriation of the
courts as consistent with legitimate law. Traditional requirements regarding objectivity and
anonymity were overlooked in favor of currying favor with Nazi officials.22 One of the best
known political and legal theorists at the time, Carl Schmitt, was particularly willing to renege
on commitments to fair and balanced justice as he claimed, "In the decisive case of political
crime, the use of norms and procedures merely means that the Führer's hands are tied, to the
advantage of the disobedient.”23 This means that normal judicial procedures requiring
impartiality and fairness could be overthrown in favor of policies that would punish those who
violated Hitler's ordinances and worked against him politically. They, rather than those
committing genuine civil rights crimes, were identified as the miscreants who had to be punished
and against whom allowances could be made in favor of an increasingly political justice system.
Broad scale support from the justices and legal scholars meant that the government could
implement and carry out new laws like the June 1935 reworking of paragraph 2 of the Criminal
Code declaring “that person will be punished who commits an act with which the law declares to
be punishable or which deserves punishment according to the fundamental principle of a
criminal statue or healthy popular opinion.”24 This, of course, was purposely vague as a means to
punish those who did not explicitly violate other laws. The expression “healthy popular opinion”
was a reference to the policies of Hitler and his cronies and meant they could arbitrarily enforce
punishments under the guise of legitimacy, when in reality it was sheer manipulation unhindered
by genuine allusions to morality and justice.
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As a further insult to the pretense of justice Hitler created a Plea of Nullity that was an
extraordinary appeal “on behalf of the Führer” by the chief prosecutor of the Reich to the
Supreme Court that if granted could negate previous verdicts and call for a Special Panel of the
Supreme Court or Führer’s Panel that would rule more consistently with Hitler’s policies. Of the
twenty-one cases prosecuted under this statute only one was on behalf on the defendant and in
fourteen cases a lesser verdict was altered to death.25 This law, although not a frequently used
statute, was nonetheless indicative of Hitler’s ability to undo court decisions in favor of more
favorable rulings. It degraded notions of checks on power and paved the way for Hitler to always
get his way.
Resultantly, other Nazi-inspired terminology became sedimented within the judicial
system. Legal scholars coalesced around the idea of a “consolidation of the Volk,” whereby
parameters of normalcy and law-abidingness were determined almost entirely by Hitler's national
and imperialistic commitments. Nebulous terminology associated with the overarching authority
of Nazi propaganda replaced explicitly formulated stipulations and boundaries of the law. In this
way honor and justice were no longer associated with normatively defined parameters of
acceptance in a democratically governed society. Judges were given carte blanch to impose
sentences on individuals as a means to “give visible expression to dishonor and disesteem,”
demarcating what was considered acceptable and within the confines of the Volk and allowing
for politically motivated interpretations of who was a threat and unworthy of legitimately
participating in society.26 This meant that in essence Hitler defined what society was and how the
concept of normalcy and justice could be circumscribed. Instead of allowing for intersubjective
delineations of identity, Germanic identity became inextricable connected with Hitler.
25
26

Müller, Hitler’s Justice, 129.
Müller, Hitler’s Justice, 78.

21

By the spring of 1934 Hitler no longer even needed to maintain the pretense that the
Courts were self-sustaining and independent when he established the People's Court on April 24,
1934. The People's Court answered directly to Hitler. Whereas the Supreme Court could
certainly be seen bending to Hitler’s pressure, the People’s Court was filled directly with Hitler's
cronies. It was also given responsibility to oversee trials regarding some of the most serious
crimes traditionally restricted to the Supreme Court including treason, destruction of property,
and assassination attempts.27 This meant effectively that Hitler could use the courts to deliver
capital sentences on anyone he viewed as a political dissident perpetrating crimes of the state that
he similarly controlled. By looking at courts records one can see the rise in Hitler’s paranoia as
the war went on. While 1934 to 1936 the court imposed death only 23 times, it delivered about
2,000 verdicts for death in 1944 as a result of an assassination attempt on Hitler and his
increasing fears about losing the war. The courts’ traditional avenue for impartial verdicts
became, according to the words of People’s Court prosecutor Heinrich Parrisius, a means by
which to “annihilate the enemies of National Socialism.”28 State sponsored killing was just if
Hitler said it was so.

Post-War
Hitler, by gaining absolute control of the government and judiciary, changed the face of
Germany. He created an empire that was doomed to total collapse. At his hands Germany
experienced economic, political, military, and moral devastation. And after Hitler and
Germany’s downfall, his influence had reverberating effects. Not wanting to create further
divisions in a war-torn Germany courts began disassociating Nazi subjects with their actions,
27
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placing the blame almost entirely on Hitler. Postwar German courts attempted to protect German
solidarity rather than punish war criminals.
One method used by the courts to mitigate punishments of former Nazis was to justify
their crimes using political rationales. A decision delivered by the Higher Regional Court of
Hesse after the war ruled that an SA trooper who had beaten a former Communist could be freed
based on the fact that the crime was politically motivated.29 Since the crime was not entirely
personal but instead expressed a commitment to German nationalism, it was designated
acceptable. The court encouraged broad-ranging exculpations of former vigilante justice under
the idea that it was acceptable as long as it was consistent with Hitler’s cause. Rather than punish
those who failed to exhibit moral character in the face of injustice, they released those who had
been complicit in Hitler’s violent campaigns. They disassociated their occupations as soldiers
and police from their own personal capacity to judge and take moral stands. This standard was
further perpetuated by a law that exempted “sentences for actions taken on a political basis after
8 May 1945 and that can be attributed to the special circumstances of recent years,” mitigating
the punishments of those who continued to respond violently even after the war was lost.30 This
special case of political “privileging” was in no sense limited in scope. An estimated 792,176
people benefited from statutes protecting those who had committed crimes with political motives
up until January 31 1951.31
Furthermore, although Allied powers initially removed many German justices after
winning the war, many such justices were eventually reinstated, including some of those who
had been most culpable in introducing and defending unjust, non-legitimized laws. For instance,
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Franz Massfeller, who had written commentary on the Nuremberg Race Laws and had
represented the Reich Ministry of Justice at the Wannsee Conference over the “final solution,”
was reappointed. Similarly, Heinrich Ebersberg, personal assistant to notorious Nazi justice Otto
Thierack was reappointed to his former rank.32 By reinstating these men Germans displayed the
incapacity to render impartial decisions against those most complicit in Nazi control of the
judiciary and the arbitrary brand of justice they imposed. These men were allowed to reenter a
justice system expected to uphold judicial integrity after having participated in one of the least
judicious and fair legal systems that had ever existed.
Furthermore, it was not simply the Nazi justices who were held over but significant parts
of Nazi law were also maintained. Neither occupying forces nor the initial courts took the
initiative to revoke the Law for the Prevention of Hereditary diseases that had resulted in an
estimated 350,000 forced sterilizations during the war. It was up to general physicians to petition
the government to revoke the law, which did not occur until 1974.33 The mentally handicapped
continued to be neglected by the law and seen as lesser citizens whose basic human rights could
be violated in the name of national integrity.
Similarly, newer, even harsher Nazi laws against homosexuality that were addressed in
paragraph 175 of the Criminal Code were not initially revoked by the Courts, which maintained
that they were “justified on objective grounds and can thus not be regarded as part of the
National Socialist doctrine, so that in principle no objection exists to using the new version.”34
Blatant persecution of homosexuals by Nazis was in line with contemporary German prejudices
and therefore could be maintained.
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Finally, the Court was able to maintain much of the most problematic Nazi legislation
simply by semantic editing, leaving intact some of the most nefarious and dangerous measures.
One amendment the Nazis added in 1943 was to paragraph 240 of the Criminal Code regarding
unlawful duress: “The Act is illegal if the use of force or threat to inflict harm for achieving the
desired purpose runs counter to the healthy opinion of the Volk.” The Nazis had naturally used
this vague language to implement this law on a broad scale, prosecuting and persecuting
perpetuators of any actions they considered contrary to the aims of National Socialism, even if
those acts were not technically defined as illegal. They delegitimized the Constitution by
allowing them to overstep the bounds of defined law and apply the statue in any fashion they
wanted. However, legal scholars had no problem maintaining the paragraph with one small
amendment. They held that the law contained no “National Socialist Principles.” They simply
changed the phrase “runs counter to the healthy opinion of the Volk” to “is regarded as
reprehensible.”35 In that manner they removed the most specific references to the Nazi regime
while keeping the illegitimate content.
Certainly, the allowances afforded to former Nazi criminals and policies were not limited
to the Courts. The government of Konrad Adenauer, who was elected Chancellor of Germany in
1949, was influential in the reinstatement of Nazis and the lessening of sentences imposed on
Nazi criminals. Adenauer, as the first Chancellor of the new German Republic after WWII,
expressed his concern with the “inner attitude of the German people.”36 He was particularly
worried about the German Republic’s capacity to protect itself and disconcerted over the
concerns of German soldiers who felt a loss of honor seeing their friends and comrades
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prosecuted and jailed as war criminals.37 He therefore petitioned that Nazi war criminals be
released or their sentences reduced in return for an expedited military coalition between
Germany and the western powers. He was forceful in conveying his sense that Germany’s future
and allegiance with western powers should be considered more prominently than punishing
former war criminals saying, “I do not wish this aide-memoire or what it contains to be
considered so to speak as object of exchange for a German troop contingent.”38 This expressed
his notion that he did not want to bargain over German war criminals. He was in favor of more
expeditious releases of German prisoners and a more fluid rearmament.
Adenauer, under this guise, took steps in 1951 to meet with British Foreign Secretary
Anthony Eden to discuss the “prisoner problem” and the releasing of Nazi criminals. He pleaded
for the creation of a three-judge panel with one from England, one from Germany, and the other
from a neutral country that could fairly discuss mitigating the sentences of Nazi war criminals.39
These were all steps taken under the drive to create a more future oriented German identity and
overcome the despair and lack of national identity felt by Germans after the war. And while
these were certainly acceptable policies they also arguably contributed to efforts to cover up the
crimes committed by Nazis and subsume them under a web of forgetfulness in the search for a
sustainable German identity.
This arguably allowed for the continued existence of various controversial pro- and neoNazi elements within government that continued to plague German politics. One particularly
notable example is the backlash expressed against actions taken by British High Commissioner
Sir Irvone Kirkpatrick who arrested Werner Naumann, former aide to Joseph Goebbels, and
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other former Nazis who were accused of causing agitation within the Freie Demokratishe Partei
(FDP).40 In newspapers and within political venues protestors argued that German “sovereignty
was being threatened by the intervening occupation authorities.” To them, it was unlawful for the
occupying forces to carry out justice. Conservative German Party Chief Heinrich Hellwege
argued for “prerogative of the Germans” and maintained that “the question of whether neofascist infiltration has occurred has to be clarified by the German Volk itself.”41 He, other
political leaders, and newspapers like the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung maintained that the
arrests were largely agreed upon by the German people. And while this to some extent might
have been true, it also expressed the Germans’ relative complacency in dealing with existing
Nazi elements and their still extant commitments to nationalism and self-determination.

Conservative Historians
Apologetic tendencies and the search for a common identity also are found within the
academic and scholarly community in Germany. As time has passed, conservative historians and
scholars have been looking for new ways to contextualize the Third Reich and the Holocaust as a
means to come to terms with the past, a movement often referred to as the Historikerstreit.
Modern European History Professor Peter Baldwin’s book, Reworking the Past. Hitler, the
Holocaust, and the Historians’ Debate has been influential in brining to the forefront the
historical significance of this phenomenon. This is because, “when a major power determines its
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policies by reference to its past, then this power’s past assumes a central role in world affairs.”42
Accordingly, since Germany’s economic recovery since World War II, it has become
increasingly important to develop more thorough explications of the crimes the Nazis committed,
as a means to go about coping with the past in preparation for the future.
One such method has been to call for a rehabilitation of the image of the Bismarckian
Reich and the subsequent German drive for power, claiming that each major nation has “its own
Hitler era, with its monstrosities and sacrifices.”43 Similarly, they even make a parallel argument
between more contemporary “talk about the guilt of the Germans” and the atrocities they
committed during WWII and the “talk about the guilt of the Jews”44 and how they were
perceived as having infiltrated the economy and been responsible for the abject conditions in
Germany during the Weimar Republic.
One of the more famous conservative historians who attempted to put Nazi history in a
broader context in beginning with his early work The Three Faces of Fascism was Ernst Nolte. A
theoretical scholar, some of his most famous work examines fascism in Europe from a Hegelian
perspective, charting the dialectical movement from proto-fascist French reactionary thought, to
state fascism in Italy, and eventually to complete fascism during the Third Reich.45 Nolte wanted
to show the parallels between various reactionary and rightist movements in Europe to express
the Nazis’ continuity and furtherance of a tradition they did not originally begin.
Similarly, he argued that the Nazis could be understood as a dialectical turn away from
Marxism. Inclined to discuss things in absolute terms, Nolte labeled Nazism as the key anti42
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transcendence movement in Europe in contradistinction to Marxism, which posits a need for a
full transcendence of capitalism.46 His claim was that Marxism paved the way for Nazism as its
antithesis. This is consistent with the idea that the National Socialist, by imperialistically
attempting to dominate the globe, was combating the class warfare of the Bolsheviks in the
Soviet Union and was responding to the atrocities committed by the Soviets (30). Joachim Fest,
another conservative German historian and journalist, took this view to the extreme claiming that
the primary difference between the killings carried out by the Germans and those carried out by
the Soviets was that the German murders were recognized and that “Zyklon B (a pesticide used
by Nazis during the Holocaust) represented a technological but not a moral watershed.”47 These
theoretical arguments portrayed Nazism as both an extension of and reaction to other violent
movements in Europe and attempted to put the Nazis on par with other murderous nations,
thereby relativizing the Holocaust.
One of their primary objectives, according to conservative historian Andreas Hillgruber,
was to overcome further Marxist explanations of German imperialism. He believed that the
common Marxist argument that German foreign policy was an outcome of internal struggles to
be “leftish and modish” behooved historians to look for more comprehensive explanations.48 One
such idea labeled Germany a “land in the middle.” The idea was that although Hitler certainly
had imperialistic desires, Germans did have legitimate concerns about being a “land in the
middle” and necessarily had to take preventive measures to protect themselves from foreign
encroachment. In this light, the barbarism of German imperialism could be mitigateed in favor of
a more general explanation. Michael Stürmer summed up such attempts of German historians as
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a search for “lost history.”49 According to Stürmer, the Nazis had to be historically
contextualized in order to demonstrate the inner continuity of the German Republic and make
sense of its foreign policy. Instead of attempting to erase the German war effort from history it
was important to understand German traditions for, according to Stürmer, “In a land without
memory anything is possible.”50 For these conservative historians it was important not to forget
the nature about the Third Reich.

Holocaust
In making these arguments, these historians were also opposing attempts to transcend
Nazism and pave the way for a new Germany based on moral and constitutional foundations that
overcome certain historical searches for identity. Although it might be important not to forget the
Third Reich, it is also important to recognize the utter incomprehensibility of Nazi crimes and
the systematically distorted communication that existed under Hitler. By relativizing Nazis one
arguably empathizes with those who worked within a truly regrettable political paradigm that
should only be studied objectively in an attempt to restructure the German government and
judiciary and make way for a new German tradition based on universal, morally substantiated
policies rather than historic-hermeneutic searches for a salvageable German tradition.
To better understand this objection to conservative historical interpretations of the Third
Reich one needs to look at the development of the Holocaust and its true impenetrability in moral
terms. Seeing its early development and later implementation reveals the true horrors and
dehumanization that occurred as a result. Studying its manifestation reveals its truly irrational
nature that defies all means of contextualization.
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From the beginning, Hitler foreshadowed the horrors that were going to be perpetuated
against Jews. In the early years of WWII, 1939-41, Hitler described the war as the “end of the
Jew” who was leading a “world coalition against the German people.”51 He attempted to shift
responsibility for the war he had recklessly led Germany into onto Jews, a people who had made
few explicitly aggressive moves against anyone German. Similarly, Hitler blamed the Jews for
German losses on the Eastern Front, claiming that they should be held accountable for the
160,000 deaths (early in the war but still a gross underestimation) that the Germans had
experienced there. In so doing he encouraged a backlash against Jews that would result in their
attempted extermination.52 He shielded himself from blame for heedlessly pushing Germany into
another world war by deflecting blame onto people who had already experienced seven to eight
years of persecution at his hands.
Furthermore, Hitler gave carte blanche to secret police leader Heinrich Himmler and
chief of the Gestapo police force the Reinhard Heydrich to carry out unspeakable crimes within
German occupied territories and on the eastern front. Hitler had already associated project
Barbarossa, the eastern invasion, with pushing Jews and Bolsheviks—whom he considered
synonymous—eastward and creating room for a superior Aryan race. Hitler had no qualms
giving his implicit consent for the butchers Himmler and Heydrich to carry out genocidal
missions on the Eastern Front. Himmler announced the mission explicitly after having seen
thousands of Jewish corpses lying side by side as “a glorious page in our history that has never
been and is never to be written.”53 In this way Hitler paved the way for Jews to be killed on a

51

Kershaw, Hitler 1936-1945, 489.
Kershaw, Hitler 1936-1945, 490.
53
Kershaw, Hitler 1936-1945, 487.
52

31

massive scale without taking direct responsibility. He insidiously gave consent for a mission that
few could protest or resist.
Furthermore, the Courts followed suit as eugenics laws were passed against Jews that
judicially legitimized their persecution. As the Nazis rose to power the Courts and government
agreed that “a legal barrier” to marriage needed to establish that “every form of sexual
interbreeding between Jews and those of German decent was to be made criminal.”54 This
increasingly involved a tendency to consider Jewishness a personal characteristic for which
many civil rights did not apply.
The Nuremberg law for Protection of German Blood and German Honor was interpreted
widely as it outlawed any obscene coition and additional sexual acts committed between people
of the Jewish race and Aryans.55 This stipulation was basically used to outlaw any romantic
connection between Jews and Aryans, including non-physical contact. Similarly, even kissing
was included under the law when the Sixth Criminal Chamber of the Hamburg Country Court
declared it a sexual act in 1938.56 This was shortly followed by the repeal of paragraph 1333 of
the Civil Code that made it legal to annul “racially mixed marriages.”57 These acts made it
official that Jews were a degenerate race and could not become romantically involved with
Aryans without being condemned both rhetorically and legally by the state.
Eventually, Jewish people’s personhood was totally absconded. In the late 1930s the
Jewish director of Return of Ulysses was refused compensation for his work when his contract
was nullified with the court claiming that Jews were not entitled to the same rights as a full-
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blooded German.58 Similarly, in an even more ridiculous decision six- and seven-year old Jewish
children were listed as accomplices in a crime. The children of a Jewish tanner who in 1942 had
attempted to escape the Jewish ghetto in order to engage in trade were put to death for “aiding
and abetting unauthorized departure from a Jewish housing district.”59 Clearly, by this time, the
Nazi courts had forgotten any obligation to substantively legitimize their laws and threw around
empty rhetorical phrases to continue the persecution and mass extermination of the Jews. The
Third Reich became a moral and legally impenetrable regime.
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Theories of Totalitarianism

Jürgen Habermas presents the broadest and most theoretical exposition of his concept of
moral progress in his two volume series, The Theory of Communicative Action. In these books he
attempts to convey how by integrating communicative action into its workings, a society
functions more effectively. To do so he starts at the most basic form of human engagement,
dialogue, and through extrapolation attempts to understand how large societies developed and
have integrated dialogue at different stages of human history. He explains how humans, as
communicative actors, have grown increasingly sophisticated in terms of how they develop
governmental, social, and economic institutions that are both self maintained and normatively
founded upon the approval of subjects who see their own best interests embodied in the ways
that the institutions function. But he also explains how despite general progress that has occurred
in people’s capacity to integrate communicative reason into the development of complex
societies, there have also been stumbling points that hinder communication and cause regression.
And although he functions on a more theoretical platform and gives few concrete examples, it is
obvious that many of the breakdowns in communicative action that he identified occurred during
the Third Reich. Nazi Germany, for Habermas, is a society in which leaders failed to understand
the importance of normatively justified decisions. They neglected to understand how
communicative action helps fulfill the interests of a society and how Nazi leaders, by
opportunistically restricting dialogue and criticism, were responsible for inhibiting the rational
potential of theirs and other nations.

34

Habermas predicates his argument on dual notions of understanding and engagement in
the “lifeworld.” These terms refer to the central role people play as actors in dialogues.
Fundamentally, Habermas’s ideal system is a constitutionally based democracy in which
normative models, or those agreed upon through the course of discussion and empathetic
internalization of the ideas of others, create a foundation upon which systematized processes and
bureaucracies can function. This creates a system with a well-organized and articulated set of
laws and regulations that are ultimately based on the agreement of the people and are in their
best interests. Under this pretext, according to Habermas, “reaching an understanding functions
as a mechanism for coordinating actions only though the participants in interaction coming to an
agreement concerning the claimed validity of their utterances, that is, through intersubjectively
recognizing the validity claims they reciprocally use.”60 Understanding, in this case, is
fundamentally associated with the normative foundations of government. It is what creates a
moral basis through which citizens recognize the legitimacy of each other’s claims and can use
this understanding in constructive ways to go about implementing complex processes that create
a greater mutual benefit to both parties than any individual could have achieved individually.
This involves a two-sided action, according to Habermas, in that, “the point of departure for the
normative model of action is that participants can simultaneously adopt both an objectivating
attitude to something that is or is not the case, and a norm-conformative attitude to something
that is commanded.”61 Participants in dialogue are able to come to terms with ideas that would
normally lie outside their own ability to understand by recognizing that other subjects have
interests and that the most beneficial path available to both parties is one in which they recognize
the necessity of acknowledging the best arguments and ideas and being able to mutually go about
60
61

Habermas, Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action, (Boston: Beacon, 1984), 99.
Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, 90.

35

reaching the most ideal situation. They are involved in the “lifeworld” to the extent that they
agree to participate in this process as actors, or members of a dialogue.62 An actor’s ideas can
only help to the extent that the author is willing to engage in dialogue and make himself/herself
vulnerable to criticism and self-reflection. The foundations of Habermas’s ideal government then
require subjects to engage actively and empathetically in dialogue and be amenable to criticism
and idealized conditions that lie outside their own individual strategic interests.
Habermas, based on this understanding, would consider one of the main failings of the
Third Reich leaders to be their inability to integrate intersubjective dialogue. Although the
Germans had established a relatively modern constitution in 1919 in Weimar, they still lacked
the integrative force of other longer-standing democracies like Great Britain and France. This
lack of democratic input, according to German political scientist Karl Dietrich Bracher, can best
be associated with a more resilient imperialist tradition in Germany than in other western
European countries. Despite the increasing modernization of Europe and the growth of education
and humanitarianism in the nineteenth century, Germany was more susceptible to nationalistic
and militaristic impulses than other nations. According to Bracher, there existed in Germany a
strong feeling based in natural law that “the individual ought to sacrifice himself for the greater
community of which he was a link, that therefore he did not have the right to resist the authority
of the state, even if it were held to be ‘immoral’.”63 Bracher explains how this made the
intelligentsia and bourgeoisie more inclined to anti-democratic and authoritarian impulses that
intellectuals in other countries often resisted.
These feelings were based also on a strong reaction that Germans directed at the forces
they believed were detrimental to the traditional German character. This idea was largely
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exclusionary. Although traditionally associated mainly with progress and the intensification of
tolerance, the Enlightenment concomitantly gave impetus to the extension of anti-Semitism in
the German states. It allowed Jews to reenter German society, from which they had previously
been excluded, and although often restricted from owning land, they engaged in other forms of
business. This led to Jews becoming particularly prominent in certain professions such as
commerce. Bracher claims, “Jews, because of their specialization and disproportionate
representation in economic and cultural life, controlled certain aspects of life and became the
prime factor in the spread of anti-Jewish feeling.”64 Jews became particularly vulnerable to
German conservatives who were able to characterize them as the instigators of revolution and
exploitive business practices and the general problems associated with the modernization of a
traditional agrarian society. This created an us versus them mentality by which the “soul” of the
German people became associated with the higher inherent value of German culture as opposed
to the intellectualism associated with Jews. Jews were demonized by a new “biological
anthropology” in which they were depersonalized and racially degraded, an occurrence that
Bracher believes prefaces the seemingly unemotional “carrying through” of the massive
genocide of Jews that occurred during WWII.65
These sentiments were vehemently announced by Georg Ritter von Schönerer, an
Austrian Pan-German who believed that Austria should be incorporated within a larger German
Reich and who in addition to advocating nationalist and anti-capitalism propaganda was
particularly prosecutorial of the Jews. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century he
became well-known for establishing racial purity as the primary objective behind the PanGerman mentality, claiming “Religion is nothing, race makes for the filth.” It was in-born racial
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characteristics of the Jews that made them responsible for the nefarious liberal implications of
modern societies, including freedom of the press and predatory capitalism. These ideas, along
with those of contemporaneous Vienna mayor and anti-Semite Karl Lueger had a particularly
strong effect on Hitler, who spent much of his early adulthood in Vienna and where he learned
the racial exclusionary ideas he would so powerfully promulgate during the post-WWI period.66
Similarly, Hitler, reared in this tradition of authoritarianism and hierarchy was not
amenable to notions of normative legitimacy in which he would acknowledge the arguments of
all actors and make himself accountable by participating in dialogue. Rather, he was particularly
forceful in his implementation of a police state where Jews were denied the ability to express
their feelings regarding their political and social treatment. Rather, Hitler implemented his
policies imperiously, allowing his subordinates to fight amongst themselves and then side with
the winner. Ultimately, he “reserved the right to decide when a difference of opinion could be
brought before the cabinet” and gave his approval only after most discrepancies had already been
resolved through strategic means.67 Eventually, this style of leadership meant that the cultivation
of interest groups and the currying of Hitler’s personal favor were more important for ministers
than engaging in dialogue and the cabinet ceased to meet after 1938.68
As opposed to looking for the individuals who made the best arguments or promoted the
interests of the greatest number of Germans, personal loyalty became Hitler’s most important
administrative principle. Rather than following the constitutional process or allowing the
bureaucracy to manage itself internally, Hitler imposed his will over political offices, distributing
power to loyal sycophants and paladins who were most amenable to following his directives. In
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this regard Hitler was particularly influential in protecting the interests of his Gauleiters, or party
territorial leaders, against the power of central leaders with state positions, particularly the
Minister of the Interior, Wilhelm Frick. Although considerably responsible for the consolidation
of Hitler’s power in 1933 with the Gleichschaltung, or bringing into line the various states and
political offices of the German Reich Frick’s power waned throughout the course of his tenure in
his position, one that he eventually lost to SS chief Heinrich Himmler in 1943. The Gauleiters
were particularly influential in this process, currying Hitler’s favor at the expense of Frick and
eventually inducing Hitler to acknowledge that although their administrations fell under Frick’s
official purview, an exception could be made for cases of “special political importance” whereby
Gauleiters could bypass Frick and appeal directly to Hitler.69 Their loyalty to Hitler led to him
superimposing his authority to ensure their autonomy against their constitutionally established
superiors.
Habermas’s theory for the implementation of understanding within the lifeworld revolves
around his conception of “communicative action.” One of Habermas’s general themes center on
the idea that , “communicative actions are distinguished from general acts of communication and
strategic action in that all participants pursue illocutionary aims without reservation in order to
arrive at an agreement that will provide the basis for consensual coordination of individually
pursued plans of action.”70 This means that participants do not simply enter dialogue with their
own best interests and fight stringently to protect and maintain those interests against
fundamentally disparate principles against which they can only compromise but never truly
relate. Actors involved in communicative action do not insidiously attempt to undermine or
manipulate dialogues so as to arrive at the greatest amount of individual success against
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competitors. Rather, they have illocutionary aims; that is, they want their interlocutors to
internalize and fundamentally understand their motivations and reasons to see why they can
work to the benefit of both parties. They must do so without reservation by seeing that their
greatest interest lies in coordination rather than solipsistically formulated plans. Only in this way
can they extend their knowledge and motivational states beyond anything they could have
achieved by themselves.
In this vein, Habermas labels “systematically distorted communication” that which “can
be conceived of as the result of a confusion between actions oriented to reaching understanding
and actions oriented to success. In situations of concealed strategic action, at least one of the
parties behaves with an orientation to success, but leaves others to believe that all
presuppositions of communicative action are satisfied.”71 In this case, everyone suffers as a
result of personal initiatives towards success that do not acknowledge the inherent intersubjective
character of language. From a Kantian perspective, subjects hurt themselves when they
disrespect the rationality of others. They neglect to account for the fact that theoretical language
is a tool that can only be legitimately applied when used to communicate as openly and with as
great an understanding as possible. When they misrepresent their motives, everyone suffers.
These principles stand in contradistinction to the theory of the totalitarian state developed
and implemented by the Nazis. Although the term now carries with it a pejorative connotation,
the Nazis praised and strove for totalitarianism. Goebbels, during the Nazi struggle for power,
claimed, “The goal of the revolution must be a totalitarian state pervading all spheres of public
life.” This was meant to distinguish the Nazi national socialist mentality from the liberal
constitutional state that had existed during the Weimar years. It was meant as a reaction against
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federalism and the division of power that many German citizens associated with disorganization
and chaos due to the infighting that had occurred in the Weimar government. To justify the
Gleichschaltung that occurred under Frick and others, the Nazis made distinctions between types
of government in Western European states labeled liberaler Rechsstaat and their own brand of
government called nationaler Rechsstaat. The premise was that while a liberal government
emphasized constitutionalism, a system that had failed Germany during the Weimar years, their
brand of nationalism would reconcile justice and political necessity and draw on a powerful
German conservative tradition.72 What this in practical terms meant was that the Nazis could
implement policy from above without necessarily consulting the vast majority of citizens who
would be most affected by the policies implications.
Habermas further believes that people should not force dramatic breaks from
communicative processes of rational realization as this promotes unease and misunderstanding.
He claims, “Continuity and coherence are measured by the rationality of the knowledge accepted
as valid. This can be seen in disturbances of cultural reproduction that get manifested in a loss of
meaning and lead to corresponding legitimation and orientation crises.”73 Cohesion for
Habermas, rather than being a single ideology, was best realized when processes of
communicative action are implemented so that subjects fundamentally understand and accept as
valid the policies by which they live.
The Nazis, as reactionaries against the Weimar Republic and a new system of dialogue
and validation, represented a great discontinuity in the rationalization of politics. By presenting
the message of unity through a lack of dissent and a lack of outside input, Nazi leaders promoted
misunderstanding and disorientation rather than the cohesion they claimed to be developing. This
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trend manifested in the often contentious relationship between army commanders and state and
party officials. Although the Nazis were extremely militaristic and therefore in favor of a strong
army, disagreements between army officials and Hitler and other Nazis functionaries were
common. Hitler, in the pursuit of his imperialistic policies in Eastern Europe, was often oblivious
to outside objections and truth claims, even from those more qualified than him to make them.
He was very much inclined to reject the more conservative claims of army commanders and
foreign diplomats who were more reluctant to embark on an aggressive foreign policy.
Therefore, in addition to replacing the more conservative and traditional but better trained and
balanced Foreign Minister Constantin von Neurath with Joachim Ribbentrop in 1938, Hitler had
the Reich War Minister, Werner von Blomberg, “retired” after he received the convenient news
that Blomberg’s new wife had previously worked as a prostitute. In a much more insidious
manner, operating on intelligence from the Gestapo under Himmler’s command, Hitler was able
to dismiss Commander-in-Chief of the army Werner von Fritsch on trumped up charges that
Fritsch was a homosexual. Although the evidence that appeared to prove this point was later
recanted by a witness, it nonetheless gave impetus for Hitler in February of 1938 to relieve
Fritsch of his command and assume absolute control as head of the army.74 He opportunistically
undid the careers of professional military men, broke with a long tradition of working towards
one’s rank through promotion, and assumed control of a massive fighting force that he had no
personal experience commanding. He therefore greatly de-rationalized the entire process.
Habermas associates the gradual development of democracy and constitutionalism as
indicative of the general progress of mankind. On this basis he agrees with sociologist Émile
Durkheim in his notion that a great leap in human development was made when the powerful and
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all-encompassing religious forces that united people were gradually transformed into more
democratic and dialogic impulses and understandings. Habermas, interpreting Durkheim,
describes this as a process by which “The aura of rapture and terror that emanates from the
sacred, the spellbinding power of the holy, is sublimated into the binding/bonding force of
criticizable validity claims and at the same time turned into an everyday occurrence.”75 Slowly,
people develop the ability to transmute religious solidarity into a process of dialogue, criticism,
and self-reflection that results in mutual understanding and betterment.
Habermas believes that this idea can be rightly associated with the ability of a society to
unlock its collective intelligence. First, it is necessary that a society be united in solidarity, an act
that religion can help perform. Afterwards, however, it needs a more generalizable and
transcendent system or morality through which people more perspicaciously understand the ties
that keep them together. Habermas claims, “The abstraction of worldviews, the universalization
of law and morality, and growing individuation can be conceived as developments that … in the
midst of a seamlessly integrated society, the rationality potential of action oriented to reaching
understanding becomes unfettered.”76 This “rationality potential” can only be unlocked when
morality is universalized and normatively founded. In this way, all qualified citizens, regardless
of rank or status, can participate in the growth and development of their society. Their unique
contributions can be unleashed and contribute to an overall, well-integrated solidarity that will
certainly exceed any hierarchically regimented policy that stratifies and disallows citizens from
actively engaging in and contributing to the political process.
In this light, Germany’s transition from a Republic into a totalitarian hierarchy violates its
efficacy and its ability to integrate outside ideas. In fact, even Nazi leaders were often unable to
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use their abilities to best influence government. Because of their constant need to compete with
one another for power and influence, they were burdened by antagonisms and constant
infighting—conflicts that often caused them to take extreme measures.
This dynamic contributed in a fundamental way to the mass murder of Jews. It led to the
infighting that occurred between Alfred Rosenberg, a Nazi intellectual and head of the Reich
Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and Heinrich Himmler, leader of the SS. In the fall
of 1941, Himmler, who was already Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germandom,
a position that gave him discretion to control operations with regard to ethnic Germans who lived
in the greater German Reich among other responsibilities regarding the resettlement of migrants,
petitioned Hitler for more power regarding the relegation of populations in the East, an closely
associated with Rosenberg’s office. Although Himmler had already been ordering the
commitment of atrocities in the East in his capacity as head of the SS, he wanted to encroach on
Rosenberg’s responsibilities and gain more power. He obtained Hitler’s approval to extend his
capacity on September 18 as Reich Commissioner to all German-occupied eastern territories.
This meant he could be in “control of security” in “internal matters” in these territories in
addition to controlling the police. To solidify this power and emphasize his new authority over
Rosenberg he petitioned Hitler and on September 24 got his approval to name Heydrich,
Himmler’s second in command and one of the men who most ardently pursued the murder of
Jews, Deputy Reich Protector, thereby ensuring that the Germans would continue with their
plans to annihilate Germans in the occupied territories. At the end of the month, Himmler
emphasized to the leaders of Einsatzgruppe D, one of the most violent companies in the SS, that
they should engage in total destruction of Jews, including women, children, and families in the
territories to which they were assigned. This elicited one of the most dramatic radicalizations of
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Nazi policy towards Jews, the total eradication of a given population within a given territory.77
To solidify his power over Rosenberg and authority within the German occupied territories,
Himmler helped lead a genocide.
Importantly, Habermas’s form of democratic solidarity requires a strong sense of
individuality. Habermas says, “Anyone who participates in social interaction in the
communicative role of the first person must appear as an actor who demarcates from facts and
norms in an inner world to which he has privileged access and who, simultaneously, vis a vis
other participants, takes initiatives that will be attributed to him as his own actions for which he
is responsible.”78 This means that citizens cannot be rightfully subsumed under a adheres allencompassing ideology. They cannot be identified as a single homogenous entity that sticks
absolutely to certain tenets. Rather, all individuals contribute something unique to a society.
Regardless of how deeply the state penetrates into their lives, there is still some particular
knowledge that is singularly theirs. Ultimately, then, they cannot simply follow orders and obey
absolutely. Rather, each individual is accountable for his/her actions. This responsibility,
according to Habermas, means that one must “get clear about who one wants to be, and from this
horizon to view the traces of one's own interactions as if they were deposited by the actions of a
responsible author, of a subject that acted on the basis of a reflective relation to self.”79 Wellacting subjects, in Habermas’s view, need to come to terms with the decisions they make and
how those decisions orient them towards future action. Although they cannot always control all
variables in their lifeworlds, they can responsibly engage in self-reflection through which they
consider the consequences of their previous actions, learn from them, and change themselves
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accordingly as a means to orient themselves towards future action. However, their ability to do
so is greatly restricted when they cannot engage. They as subjects lose individuality and rational
potential when their access to democratic input is limited and thereby self-reflection is hindered.
German policy ran completely contrary to this principle as it promoted a race-biological
theory of absolute cohesion that called for complete unity of ideas against the threats of outsiders
of different races and religions. According to Marxist German political scientist Franz Neumann,
this demand on the part of Nazis for ideological unity was used because it was a “foundation for
imperialist expansion.”80 When nations rely on the idea of the sovereignty of their people, there
is nothing ideological to justify their ascendency over others. They have no right to interfere in
the governance of other nations. When the Germans came to power, in order to challenge outside
states, it was necessary they work in absolute unity. Therefore they needed to challenge the
sovereignty of outside states. According to Neumann, “The alleged superiority of the German
Nordic race performed this function” and that “the aim was to organize society for imperialist
ventures.”81 In this way, the Nazis distracted attention from internal tensions to project these
antagonisms outwardly in an expression of German imperialism that glorified the Germanic race
and denigrated outsiders and those from many other European countries as racially inferior.
Citizens under the German Reich had little chance of gaining a sense of responsibility for their
personal destinies when all of their authority over the details of their lives was subsumed under
the state, the Nazi movement, and its more global movements.
Additionally, Himmler, one of the men most strongly responsible for perpetuating the
Nazi race philosophy, organized the SS and his sphere of influence along principles whereby
soldiers were expected to follow the orders of their superiors without question and without input.
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And this strict expectation of obedience extended to all facets of their lives including their
personal relationships. In fact, Himmler had much to do and say regarding the marriages and sex
lives of SS men. By 1934 he had formalized a process of approving of SS marriages. Any SS
man who wanted to marry had to produce the family trees of himself and his wife, extending
back to 1800, that was to be submitted to the Race and Settlement Main Office in order to verify
that both partners met the appropriate “racial” criteria. Similarly, Himmler reserved final say in
the approval of any SS officer.82 Ultimately, the decision of whom to marry, a right traditionally
associated with free choice, was reserved for Nazi authoritaries.
According to Habermas, only through a process of individuation, whereby an individual
realizes his/her unique capacity as a contributing member of a more general dialogue can selfrealization occur through which an individual identifies himself/herself with “autonomous action
in general” with an “unmistakable life history.”83 This leaves an individual less susceptible to allencompassing claims that deny citizens’ singularity. It promotes people’s abilities to use their
own reason to come to decisions rather than blindly following the dictates of the state. This
ability contributes to a “master of situations” in which the actor understands himself/herself as
“the initiator of his accountable actions, and the product of the traditions in which he stands, the
solidarity groups to which he belongs, and of the socialization and learning processes to which
he is exposed.”84 In this way, it enhances an individual’s abilities to make distinctions regarding
one’s own history. One can more rationally decide how to approach new ideas and new people
when he/she has a better understanding of what it means to be a member of a dialogic and
hermeneutic community. This allows one to integrate a more thorough understanding of one’s
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position as a contributing member of a community in the course of his/her speech actions that
contribute to the development and enhancement of that community. In this way, the selfrealization that comes from genuine individuation again contributes to individuals being better
able to contribute to the overall rationalization and progression of their community.
Such a process of self-realization did not occur in the Third Reich because of mass
dehumanization. Nazi leaders were particularly intent that the individual characteristics of the
populace be downplayed and the movement be established as everybody’s main priority. Instead
of conglomerating to express their different points of view and make personal contributions to a
larger dialogue, people were expected to understand that the “Führer stood as the absolute
unifying point in and above the movement.” It was Hitler who was the focal point of all political
and social organization. This meant that individuation was considered nefarious and ineffective
and that the values of devotion, service, and subordination were lauded as the best
characteristics. Of course, instead of being vulnerable to criticism Hitler was always correct
regardless of what he commanded.85 When he was not obligated to engage in dialogue and allow
the best argument to present itself, he had the ability to present his theories as if they were
unquestionably and invariably a correct attitude. This detracted from the ability of members of
society to draw on its collective rational potential and ensured the continuation of a selfperpetuating process, whereby the claims of a single individual could never be challenged and
the resources of reason and dialogue remained stagnant.
Nazi leaders, by forcing upon their citizens complicity in a German authoritarian,
imperialistic, and racial mission to conquer Europe, violated the dictates of Habermas’s
communicative action, thereby greatly reducing the rational potential of their society and causing
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a general regression in Germany’s ability to use knowledge to fulfill its human interests. By
denying people access to democratic institutions they weakened the normative foundations of
Germany society. Similarly, by not acknowledging the importance of outside input and criticism
they left themselves vulnerable to infighting that in its least pernicious form caused redundancy
and at its worst helped lead to the Holocaust through aggressive initiatives by men like Himmler
and his subordinate Reinhard Heydrich, who by “working towards the Führer” at the expense of
collaboration with many of their fellow Nazi leaders took radical action to gain Hitler’s approval.
Once Hitler became the center of all social policy and his word became final, there was little
chance for finding solid ground on which to base valid, well-understood and societally approved
decisions. Instead, people were dehumanized and left hapless as their capacity to engage in selfcriticism and the determination of their own destinies was greatly weakened. The Third Reich
represents a breakdown in society’s use of its rationality.
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The Imperialism of Human Interest

Despite the pervasive corruption and inhuman cruelty perpetuated by those in power
during the Third Reich, the empire was not necessarily poorly administered or its ideological
foundations illogically extended. Rather, in many ways it was extremely well organized with an
extensive bureaucracy and in-depth rationalization of certain policies including the
administration of the courts and the exploitation of slave labor. Similarly, the racial and antiSemitic ideology perpetuated by the Nazi regime was not without precedence. Although not
nearly as discriminatory or official, many previous German officials and thinkers, including
those most responsible for forming a German political tradition, like Frederick the Great, and
those highly influential as German intellectuals, like Johann Gottlieb Fichte, both to varying
degrees expressed anti-Semitic ideas. Taken to the extreme, these ideas were logically extended
by Hitler and Goebbels in an ideology of hate and reaction against the forces they associated
with the plight of the German economy and society that occurred after World War I.
Resultantly, following World War II, within the intellectual and particularly
philosophical community, there has been a great deal of criticism directed against reason and
logic and the pernicious oppressive consequences they can have on human freedom and liberty.
Although they may have at one point been used to help create the modern sciences and generate
modern societies, they were eventually brutally extended by the Nazis and other totalitarian
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governments in extremely oppressive ways that had horrible consequences on human dignity and
freedom. Those who advocated a critical reaction against the reason they saw manifested in the
Nazis and other modern regimes include post-structuralists and post-modernists including Michel
Foucault, Jaques Derrida, Maurice Blanchot and others who were heavily influenced by earlier
theorists like Martin Heidegger and Friedrich Nietzsche. They were important as philosophical
critics of the continual extension of reason and logical so ardently pursued by many of their
modern predecessors such as Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Karl Marx.
Arguably, they exaggerated the nefarious impact of strict logical extension in favor of more
visceral or deconstructive methods and in doing so they committed an injustice against the
rebirth of reason and rational inquiry beginning with the European Enlightenment.
To contend with these criticisms and to reawaken people’s faith in reason and knowledge,
Habermas in 1971 published Knowledge and Human Interests. In this work, Habermas finds in
Kant, Hegel, Marx and their successors a means by which knowledge can be appropriated to
fulfill human interests rather than being used in strictly instrumental or destructive ways like the
Nazis did. This also ties into his rejection of the post-modernists in that it provides a platform on
which knowledge could be utilized to free human creative potential. One need not necessarily
reject knowledge in an attempt to embrace visceral or more instinctual impulses. Rather, reason
can help free humans as a species. It can mediate between technical and social knowledge to help
better the human condition.
Habermas begins his criticism with Hegel as the man he believes best exemplifies the
beginnings in a modern way of thinking that emphasizes the human capacity for evolution and
the cultivation of reason to better the human condition. In this way, according to Professor
Ronald Stromberg, “Hegel secularized this vision of progress through time toward a final
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reunion with God.”86 While Kant had regarded the noumenal world, things outside of
consciousness, as fundamentally beyond human comprehension, Hegel looked for an “ideal unity
of things” that would resolve the apparent discrepancy between material objects in the world and
the human subject who interacts with them.87
In this vein, Hegel was more concerned with politics than he was economics. He held that
the most important institution was the nation state and that any particular state that dominated
did so rightfully as it was an inevitable dialectical manifestation of proper societal development.
For this reason, people should be reconciled to the prerogatives of the state. Hegel was a strong
believer in positive freedom, or the need for the state to intervene on peoples’ behalves for their
own betterment, and largely rejected negative freedom, or the right to be left alone.88
Habermas identifies Hegel as an eliminator of transcendental doubt in a process of
radicalizing the epistemological approach terminating in Kant to see that knowledge can be
construed phenomenologically. Hegel’s approach, according to Habermas, “incorporates the
fundamental experiences which transformations of such schemata of apprehending the world and
of actions themselves have been deposited.”89 This involves a process of self-reflection whereby
the subject overcomes obstacles by understanding its own capacity to relate to objects as a
subject and other subjects within an intersubjective community, thereby internalizing outside
knowledge in a process of self-betterment. Similarly it dispels the notion that a single individual
is capable of achieving transcendental knowledge single handedly; rather it is a process of self-
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critique that is dialectically influenced by other subjects and objects. Knowledge is
misappropriated when it is not used in a critical manner.
However, Habermas, like Marx is critical of Hegel’s idealism. Habermas holds that
Hegel’s subject must be able to attain “pure knowledge through the experience of reflection.”90
Hegel, an idealist, needs a subject who already begins with “sense certainty.” This is particularly
problematic when applied to science. “Phenomenology would have to evolve its thought process
from the standpoint of speculative scientific knowledge (in order for new scientific discoveries to
be made) But it could do so dialectically not scientifically.”91 And since absolute knowledge is
supposed to be certain, this neglects to account for the material contingencies of the world.
According to Habermas, Marx correctly responds to Hegel in that he was overly idealistic
and neglected the material and pragmatic considerations that are the most important elements in
the decision making process. Accordingly, for Marx, nature is prior to the world of mankind.
Habermas, interpreting Marx, believes it is the “the root of laboring subjects as natural beings
and also enters into their labor processes.”92 Instead of the evolution of ideas being the
fundamental predecessors to increasing leaps in knowledge, higher levels of consciousness come
into fruition as a response to external circumstances, particularly material conditions. In this way,
“We always encounter nature within the horizon of the world-historical self-formative process of
mankind.”93 This means that human nature is a response to the material world and an
appropriation of nature rather than an externalization of mind.
Marx, thereby, addresses the importance of paying attention to the actual material and
pragmatic circumstances in which one lives and realizing that individuals cannot necessarily
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transcend their physical environments through only the cultivation and implementation of ideas.
Rather, they must learn to adapt to the contingencies of nature. This concept can be relevantly
applied in criticism of Hitler’s grand and overly idealistic development projects that were
projected on such a large scale that they neglected actual material conditions and instead of
adapting to nature attempted to control it. For instance, Hitler in his megalomaniacal effort to
expand Berlin demanded that the streets be built 130 meters wide despite lack of feasibility and
opposition from Berlin mayor Julius Lippert. In his reckless drive to out-build Paris, he
demanded construction plans that would totally revamp Berlin and would require inordinate
amounts of materials and human recourses. Similarly, he rejected all criticism, ignoring city
officials and arbitrarily employing those, like architect Albert Speer, who were willing to indulge
his grandiose visions.94 The project’s sheer unattainability is indicated by the fact that it was
hardly even begun.
Hitler’s refusal to work practically within his given circumstances had morbid
implications for peoples of those conquered by the Third Reich during Hitler’s imperialistic
conquest. Because Hitler dedicated so many material and human resourses to the German war
effort on both the Eastern and Western Fronts, Germany was severely lacking in food, industrial,
and military production resources. As a means to combat these deficiencies, the Third Reich
employed copious amounts of slave labor. Combined with Hitler’s jingoistic and genocidal
fervor, this led Germans at the Wannsee Conference in 1942, in which the “final solution” of the
liquidation of Europe’s Jews was agreed upon, to quickly exterminate Jews in gas chambers but
also to work many to death to increase German armaments and agricultural output.95 In this way,
the Third Reich became a regime that was logistically dependent on foreign and slave labor.
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Everyone in power in the Third Reich became complicit in the using of slave labor including
architect and Reich Armaments Minister, Albert Speer, who actively recruited 100,000 prisoners
from the Ruhr region to work on armaments and the building of barracks for prisoners in
Auschwitz III where thousands of other forced laborers were worked to death.96
Similarly, Habermas believes that Marx reflects a correct appropriation some of the
pragmatic and scientific considerations of Kant that Hegel wrongly overlooked. This involves
the progression of scientific and technical knowledge that revolves around an “invariant relation
of the species to its environment, which is established by the behavioral system of instrumental
action.”97 This type of knowledge is subject to trial and error in a process of revision whereby
empirical evidence is gathered to either validate claims.
This type of legitimately conducted, methodologically verified procedure is the antithesis
of Nazi racial and eugenic science that was hardly universally valid. Rather than engaging in
standard traditional scientific procedure, Nazi eugenicist researchers violated nearly all rules of
medical ethics when they “succumbed to the idea that racially inferior or subhuman people could
legitimately be used as the objects of medical experimentation.”98 Instead of conducting
research, the talents of many medical professionals were insidiously put to use in the forced
sterilization of criminals, Jews, and those generally considered abnormal. Similarly, murder was
labeled preventive medicine.99 The problem, of course, is that proper science involves feedback
and critique that establishes the facticity of universally valid and testable claims, a process that is
greatly hindered in a totalitarian state where one opinion or outlook subsumes others.
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Unfortunately this type of bad science had legitimating effects on eugenicists outside
Germany, including those in the United States, where forced sterilization laws had resulted in
approximately 15,000 sterilizations by 1939 and the encouraging of people like Harry Laughlin,
who in 1931 called for the forced sterilization of 15 million Americans he believed to be from
racially inferior stock. Heidelberg actually awarded him an honorary doctorate in 1936.100 This
encouraged a path of destruction where instead of engaging in actual empirical research and
accepting medical ethics, these doctors worked within an extremely racist and unproductive
paradigm not rooted in genuine human interests.
Although in its Bolshevik manifestation in Russia, communism had severe consequences
for millions of peasants and led to large scale privation, Habermas maintains that Marxian theory
appropriately recognizes the paramount importance of material and moral parity in human
interactions. Rather than emphasizing the Hegelian notion that moral conflicts must be
reconciled after a period of confrontation, Marx holds that conflicting moral positions can be
reconciled with the overcoming of scarcity and through what Habermas calls “uncoercive
interaction on the basis of communication free from domination.” Habermas associates this idea
with “the transition of a history freed from the dialectic of the moral life, which could unfold in
the medium of dialogue on the basis of production relived of human labor.”101 In this way,
dialogue becomes a medium no longer impeded by process of strategic positions that are
necessarily contradictory but rather through genuine communication free from dominating forces
in which participants genuinely appropriate the moral influence of other actors. In this process,
citizens agree on the foundations and principles of the claim rather than pursuing self-centered
goals until unsuccessful.
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This concept is antithetical to the way in which Nazi leaders conducted business. The
most powerful figures in the Third Reich such as Heinrich Himmler, Joseph Goebbels, and
Herman Göring worked to gain Hitler’s approval at the expense of other influential leaders.
Instead of engaging in dialogues that with established and universally accepted validity claims,
they avoided one another, meeting rarely, and in the meantime pursuing their own agendas at the
expense of solidarity and collective efficiency.
Goebbels, in particular, was particularly corrupted. Initially, as a young academic, he
believed in the potentially liberating effects of communism. Although he despised socialists in
Germany, he initially lauded Bolshevism in Russia. This led him to join the more socialistic
northern contingent of the Nazi movement under the leadership of brothers Gregor and Otto
Strasser. However, Goebbels was highly vulnerable to Hitler’s image as an absolute and
infallible leader. Therefore, he radically rejected and violently worked against the Strasser
brothers when he realized that by doing so he could curry favor with Hitler and further his own
position in the movement. He opportunistically rejected his earlier ideological commitments to
pursue influence strategically.102
Similarly, lack of moral sentiment and good will meant that Hitler and his subordinates
recklessly extended to the domestic front unilateral ideological positions that were pursued at the
expense of genuine consensus regarding how to meet citizens’ needs. For instance, agricultural
production was put in the hands of an incredibly incompetent ideologue named Richard Darré, a
long time Nazi, who was supposed to strive for autarky in food supplies because of Germany’s
isolationism and preparation for war. Unfortunately for the Nazis, this was an impossibility, and
its lack of feasibility led to Darré blaming large agricultural producers for the failure and
advocating a large peasant class with many small farms. This poorly formulated policy
102

Reuth, Ralf Georg. Goebbels, (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1993), 75.

57

exacerbated the already deplorable food crises in Germany as small farms could not compete
viably with larger corporations, especially since iron and steel were prioritized for armaments
production, making it often impossible for small farmers to come up with the resources needed to
purchase equipment. Hitler failed to correctly understand the failure of Darré’s program as a
result of Nazi propaganda and instead used to make further calls for more living space to the East
and continue the violent appropriation of foreign lands.103
This all largely came about, according to historian David Schoebaum, as a result of the
culture of disaffection that the Nazis had exploited to come to power. The Nazis promoted failed
programs like Darré’s as a desperate means to “form a fair-weather constellation whose stability
was virtually identical with the success of its political leadership in balancing the conflicting
demands and requirements of industry and agriculture.”104 Because Nazis had generated much of
their support from disaffected farmers and rural land owners they often went out implementing
programs based on antiquated notions of how society should be organized that were consistent
with their radical ideology rather than using the best administrators and attempting to find the
most practical solutions.
Despite his useful contributions to Hegel’s dialectical model, Habermas also finds certain
problematic elements in Marx’s theories. Habermas believes that Marx combines interaction and
work under the same term “praxis” inappropriately. In this regard, Habermas believes Marx
focuses too much on economic and logistical material concerns at the expense of appropriately
acknowledging the importance of an interactive and communicative model of social production.
He misses the importance of Hegel’s recognition of a self-constituting subject. To improve his
philosophy, Marx should “have taken up Hegel’s critique of subjectivism of Kant’s epistemology
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and surpassed it materialistically.”105 This means that the “self-constitution of the species in the
medium of social labor and class struggle, is possible only though the self-reflection of the
knowing subject.”106 Marx should not totalize the dialectical process and associate it with an
ideal labor state but should instead recognize praxis as an interaction between man and nature
through both instrumental practice and communicative action. A subject can only come to terms
with itself via discourse with other subjects, whereby he or she internalizes social norms in a
process of self-reflection and moral appropriation. Only once this has happened can subjects
instantiate better material and social practices. Hegel understood the importance of this social
process while neglecting the importance of instrumental action where subjects effect their
physical environments. Marx, on the other hand, was too narrowly concerned with material and
economic conditions without paying enough attention to socializing via communicative action.
Working with this criticism of Marx, Habermas clarifies the role of philosophy as a
science of critique. That philosophy is the appropriate discipline to determine exactly what place
science and pragmatism have in regards to social interaction and human interest. This will avoid
an unrestrained pursuit of scientific knowledge against the interests of social emancipation and
betterment of society. The importance of using science in a morally legitimate and agreed upon
way will help avoid catastrophes like the pseudo-scientific racial scientific knowledge that was
forced upon citizens during the Third Reich.
For the Nazis, “applying principles of racial hygiene to society meant sweeping away
traditional morality and replacing it with a system of ethics that derived bad and good solely
from the imagined collective interests of the German race.”107 Those who believe in eugenics
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claimed without scientific foundation that they were making breakthroughs in modern science.
And because they were supported by the Reich their scientific methodologies went largely
unchallenged.108 Therefore, establishing the foundations of appropriate scientific inquiry can
help people avoid sacrificing objectivity or hermeneutic solidarity in favor of propaganda value.
German emphasis on racial values above the interests of legitimate scientific inquiry also
impeded the real hard sciences, especially physics and engineering. In particular, Nazi officials
heedlessly subsumed the interests of science under the interests of the war and were responsible
for a huge German brain drain because of their unwillingness to use Jewish scientists. Germans,
although some of the most pioneering scientists before the war, lost much of the initiative in
appropriating Einstein’s relativity theory. Although Einstein was originally German, he left the
country largely due to its persecution of Jews. Resultantly, the Nazis’s labeled relativity theory
false and Einstein a “Jewish Fraud” whose theories must be rejected in favor of ‘Aryan Physics’
under the leadership of German physicist Philipp Lenard who despite being a Nobel Prize winner
was a virulent opponent of relativity theory.109 This would have severe consequences on the
German scientific community, largely setting it back as one of the world’s foremost leaders in
new science and even having military implications regarding the development of the atomic
bomb.
Like in all other sectors in the Third Reich, leaders also played favoritism in the sciences,
promoting scientists amenable to Nazi ideology even if they were not necessarily the best or
most experienced candidates. One example was physicist Johannes Stark, who despite being
marginally distinguished in his own right, was seriously mistaken in his opposition to quantum
mechanics. By currying favor with Nazis, especially ideologue Alfred Rosenberg, Stark was
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made president of the Imperial Institute of Physics and Technology where he appointed Aryan
supporters to university positions and diverted money from those studying relativity theory and
quantum mechanics. In this regard, he was particularly ruthless in demeaning the work of
Werner Heisenberg, the pioneer of quantum mechanics, and one of the century’s most influential
scientists. Stark campaigned against Heisenberg being appointed the Chair of Theoretical
Physics in Munich and through his persistent resistance greatly diminished Heisenberg’s
possibilities for being significantly incorporated into the best regarded scientific circles during
the Third Reich.110
Habermas then certainly has problems with a tradition of scientific positivism he finds
initial grounds for with Marx by which intellectuals “want to eliminate orientations of inquiry
that are meaningless because they are undecidable…restricting to ‘facts’ the object domain of
possible scientific analyses.”111 This importantly disrupts the metaphysical standpoint by starting
from the bottom, empirical conditions rather than a top-down ideal approach whereby ideas
determine facticity. However, he does believe in it as beneficial in that it “adopts the basic rule
of the empiricist schools that all knowledge has to prove itself through the sense certainty of
systematic observation that secures intersubjectivity.”112 This importantly prevents solipsism and
non-recognition of the importance of social communities in which subjects must necessarily
learn and adapt to others they regard as legitimate critics. This is antithetical to Nazi ideology in
that Hitler strongly promoted a hierarchical system of command that largely disavowed the
importance of communication as something to secure the legitimacy of various undertakings.
This failure was prominently displayed in the Hitler’s project to build super rockets capable of
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destroying London. The Rockets, labeled V1s and V2s, were designed by rocket scientist
Wernher von Braun and were said to possibly be capable of great destruction. However, they
were still in the primary stages of the design process and had not actually been tested.
Nevertheless, Hitler made the unilateral decision to throw great recourses into their production,
wishing to construct several thousand. In reality only tens were produced and their effects were
minimal in a great waste of time and resources Furthermore, the project necessitated great deals
of labor, something the Nazis had little to spare. Therefore, it engaged thousands of forced
laborers who faced deplorable conditions and made men like Albert Speer, the Armaments
Minister, increasingly culpable of using slaves to further the Nazi war effort.113
Similarly, the positive method involves a systematic procedure capable of ordering the
infinite number of facts people encounter in the world. Extending and regulating these laws to
provide strict orders is an important human capacity.114 Unfortunately, the Nazis largely
neglected to make logical and systematically accurate extensions of their various programs. For
instance, as discussed in Chapter 1, laws were inappropriately extended. Hitler’s unilateral
decision to exterminate Jews meant that the normal parameters of the law did not apply to them.
Instead, they could be arbitrarily persecuted using vague rationales whereby basically any
commercial or romantic interaction they undertook was grounds for sending them to
concentration camps. Instead of their being a very stable, definitive and accurate legal system, it
instead was organized chaotically and law implemented arbitrarily as a means to curry favor with
Hitler at the expense of maintaining well-ordered legal procedure.
Habermas believes there is something valuable to be learned regarding the positive
method from Wilhelm Dilthey, a German predecessor of Hegel. Dilthey, for Habermas,
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represents an important extension of German philosophical knowledge in that he acknowledges
the importance of interest in human action. According to Habermas, interpreting Dilthey, “In the
context of life relations an object is grasped theoretically only insofar as it manifests itself within
value orientations and, at the same time, is subject to the rules of possible purposive activity.”115
This speaks to a process by which the past is made present reflectively in order to for to prepare
oneself for the future, a process whereby knowledge is utilized in a progressive way.
This is radically different from the way in which the Nazis used their experience during
World War I. Not only did the Nazis throw themselves into a global conflict, an action that
previously had disastrous consequences, they also made many of the same mistakes militarily.
Hitler stupidly involved Germany on two fronts believing, like generals had during WWI, that
Germany had enough resourses to divert from the Western to the Eastern Front after lightning
speed attacks. Similarly, he was resolute to take the Soviet city of Leningrad rather than the
capital in Moscow in his stubborn desire to downface communism by taking the symbolic world
capital of Bolshevism. In diverting vast military and human resources in his drive to take
Leningrad, Hitler disobeyed many of his top generals including prominent Eastern General Erich
Marcks and Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt in a demonstration of his unmitigated solipsistic
control of the armed forces, a move that would prove disastrous when Germany eventually lost
the battle of Stalingrad and had German soldiers suffer some of the worst privation of the war.116
Habermas believes that Dilthey correctly understands the progression of identity and
human growth associated with learning. In this regard, Habermas labels Dilthey a hermeneutic
scholar or one who investigates the importance of personal and collective histories for the
shaping of current identities. Using this as a framework, Habermas claims “The meaning that
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hermeneutic understanding takes as its objective, what Dilthey emphatically calls significance,
results exclusively from the role of elements in a structure whose identity includes the continual
decay of identity just as much as the present overcoming of this corruption. Habermas holds that
Dilthey rightly understands that the overcoming of this corruption involves intersubjectivity of
undistorted communicated.117 This means that hermeneutic traditions are best instantiated when
introduced intersubjectively, among equal uncoerced actors who normatively attach themselves
to the conversation. Otherwise, without their input, hermeneutic understanding decays into
arbitrary demonstrations of power, uncorrected and stagnant.
Clearly, the Nazis violated this principle as they unilaterally excluded and ostracized
Jews from society. This process began early when they eliminated Jews from participation from
the Civil Service in April 1933.118 By doing so, they took away their ability to incorporate the
group into society and learn from their perspective. Instead of choosing to learn from Jews in a
democratic process whereby people regulate and reflexively correct their own mistakes, the
Nazis imperiously imposed their own ideology and failed to include the opinions and
perspectives of those who could have contribute to a more modern and significant multicultural
identity. Eventually, the fact that actions like this prohibition went relatively unopposed on a
large scale would lead to increasingly pernicious actions by the Third Reich including the
banning of Jews from all public facilities in 1938.119 This law was indicative of the quiescence of
German cultural progress and understanding that occurred during the Third Reich.
The main flaw of hierarchy and lack of openness is according to Habermas that “the
intersubjectivity of mutual understanding is either rigidified or falls apart, a condition of survival
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is disturbed…the possibility of unconstrained agreement and non-violent recognition.”120 This
distracts from participants abilities to strive collectively towards goals in a process in which the
totality of their efforts exceeds that of any particular individual. This lack in communication can
be seen in the pervasiveness of conflicting viewpoints, redundancy, and missed opportunities that
occurred during the Third Reich. Top ministers such as Albert Speer and Heinrich Himmler were
constantly struggling for Hitler’s approval to extend their own sphere of influence at the expense
of compromise. They did so almost entirely out of personal interest. Himmler, in particular was
extremely cruel, heavily encouraging the incorporation of slave labor into armaments production
as a means to attempt to usurp some of Speer’s power. Speer in his own drive to produce copious
amounts of weapons was receptive and complicit in the terrible treatment foreign laborers
experienced.121
Speer, reflective of major Nazi officials in general, also had conflicts with other leading
Third Reich figures including Herman Göring, Fritz Saukel, and Martin Bormann. There was a
great deal of redundancy and infighting between the Armaments Ministry controlled by Speer
and the second Four-Year-Plan, responsible for supplying the German war effort, under the
control of Göring. And although they were initially more conciliatory than most other major
officials, this conflict of interest led to much unrest between the two leaders that eventually
resulted in Speer’s largely unilateral control of war production and Göring’s fall from power.122
Speer similarly had to contend with the interests of Fritz Saukel who was in charge of Nazi
coerced labor. To spur the war effort, Speer required slave labor although he did express some
reservations regarding their cruel treatment. Saukel, conversely, was more amenable to commit
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human rights abuses in his opportunistic strive for power. Finally, there was no major political
figure in the Third Reich who did not have to contend with the ever expanding influence of
Martin Bormann. Bormann was known as an extremely sycophantic Hitler aid who basically
controlled all direct access to the Führer. He used his power ruthlessly to demean his opponents
and increase his influence. Speer, of course, did not escape his reaches as he several times had to
curb his ambitions as Bormann usurped his power and provided direction to the Führer.123 All of
this is to say that rather than working collaboratively to better Germany, almost every major
German official worked strategically to increase his own sphere of influence at the expense of
others.
Unfortunately, violence is one of few options once intersubjective bridges break down
and coercion and distortion remain constant. Resultantly, after Hitler’s totalitarian power had
been well established officials realized that violence would be necessary to undermine his
control. Major officials knew after 1942 that a German defeat was basically the inevitable
outcome of the war. They also realized that it was too late for a negotiated settlement with
Britain and other Allied powers. Nevertheless, many remained resolute that the only way to save
Germany from total collapse was to kill Hitler. Only an assassination, rather than discourse and
democracy, could save millions of German lives. General Herrmann von Tresckow, one of the
leaders of the 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler, put it best when he said, “the assassination
must be attempted at any cost…We must prove to the world and to future generations that the
men of the German resistance movement dared to take the decisive step and to hazard their lives
upon it” (Third Reich at War, 638). This is to say that with the breakdown of all intersubjective
bridges that occurred under Hitler, most Nazis felt relatively helpless to salvage the government
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but only to save the German people from total destruction through preemptive violent action, a
task that Count von Stauffenberg and others staked their lives on in Operation Valkyrie, the most
well-known attempt on Hitler’s life.124
The Austrian intellectual and psychologist Sigmund Freud, for Habermas, is the pioneer
of self-reflection. Although Freud’s theories are problematic in that they are too systematized,
they do introduce an important element of adaptation and adjustment based on self-analyzation.
According to Habermas, Freud recognizes that “the technical and practical cognitive interests
can be comprehended unambiguously as knowledge-constitutive interests only in connection
with the emancipatory cognitive interest of rational reflection.125 This is a means by which to use
knowledge to adapt to life’s contingencies in a process of self and communal betterment.
Especially important is that one use knowledge to overcome stagnant and burdening concepts as
a means to undue “dogmatic dependence” on certain principles.126
Of course, lack of self-reflection under Hitler contributed to dogmatic dependence of
leaders on Jew-hating principles. Goebbels was prominently derisive in this regard, advocating
the contradictory principles that Jews represented predatory capitalism as well as Slavic
communism, indicating an inability of Goebbels to substitute reason for the expediency of
hateful and reactionary speech.127 Rather than reflecting on what he said, Goebbels actually
integrated these ideas into his character, illogically extending and propagating them instead of
reflecting on whether they made sense. Similarly, Himmler became wholeheartedly committed to
exterminating Jews, particularly after the Wannsee conference of 1942 and the beginning of
Operation Reinhard. Despite the fact that he must have reached the realization that Germany’s
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prospects of winning the war and extending the Empire were increasingly tenuous, he prioritized
the extermination of Jews above all other interests, taking the initiative to implement Hitler’s
grand unarticulated plan, despite it being of little overall help to the Reich’s war effort.128
Hitler, in this regard, is the true Freudian embodiment of the neurotic. The system of
communication and accountability he extended during his reign is indicative of an internalized
collapse in intersubjectivity. It is reflective of a “privatized portion of excommunicated language
by which the undesired motives of action are made inaccessible to him.”129 In this case by ceding
totalitarian control of Germany to Hitler, Germans made themselves susceptible to his personal
problems without an accessible field of discourse through which the implications of his policies
could be viably discussed and acted upon. This in turn exacerbated Hitler’s already grandiose
egoism in a process of mutual destruction for both Hitler and the German people.
For this reason, if one wants to maintain a strong hermeuntic tradition, as the Germans
did in attempting to preserve a consistent unique German identity, they must do so under the
context of the “preservation and expansion of intersubjectivity of possible action-orienting
understanding.”130 People have a legitimate, world-disclosing interest in not bracketing or
particularizing speech acts but rather making them relatable and delineating them in an
intersubjective process to which access is not restricted. Only in this way can subjects avoid
hypostatizing powers to such an extent that they can remain critical. Certainly dinners in which
Hitler would deliver dull and repetitious speeches to his sycophantic underlings violate this
principle. Furthermore, they make totalitarian rulers, like Hitler, more amenable to appointing
obsequious ministers as opposed to the most competent officials. When one in power reaches the
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point where he can no longer be self-critical, he ends up doing things like appointing officials
like Joachim von Ribbentrop, a bumbling and socially caustic egomaniac to be foreign minister
over the traditional well-mannered and trained Konstantin von Neurath, thereby exacerbating
international relations and precipitating war.131
All of this stands to say that in Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas expresses the
idea that the ability of man to make progress by associating his ability to procure knowledge with
his inextricable interest in unconstrained communication, an idea that stands in contradistinction
to the functioning of the Third Reich under Hitler. Man can only be autonomous and responsible
when he attempts to engage in dialogue that is not superseded by other unilateral or arbitrary
interests but instead involves general moral appropriation of outside influences.132 Ultimately,
“bureaucratically prescribed partisanship” or the type of hierarchical uncritical stance taken by
Nazi supporters, “goes all too well with contemplatively misunderstood value freedom.”133
Knowledge that is increasingly instrumentalized to further particular ideology or opinion stands
contrary to a legitimate means by which to achieve progress and growth that furthers human
interest.
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Fascism and Facticity

In Between Facts and Norms Jürgen Habermas establishes his definitive positions regarding the
constitution of a democratic state in reference to the formation of legislative and juridical bodies. He
outlines how his general theory of communicative action can be more broadly applied to constitutional
states as a means to guarantee normative validity in governmental and bureaucratic practices. His goal is
to clarify the lines between facticity and validity, or about how to mediate between processes that address
factual evidence and those that incorporate intersubjective input. By extrapolating his theoretical
postulates and applying them to real-life situations, one can see how clearly the Third Reich leaders
violated the dictates of communicative action and therefore prevented their actions from being
normatively founded. Moreover, it becomes clearer not only how Germans suffered as a result of the Nazi
leaders’ action, but how, because of lack of input and effective communication, the empire was doomed
to fail politically, economically, and militarily.
The actions taken by Third Reich ministers were normatively unfounded because they lacked the
a proper procedural basis that “secures, in the temporal, social, and substantive dimensions, the
institutional framework that clears the way for processes of communication governed by the logic of
application discourses.”134 Processes of communication could never be secured in a regime that expedited
its punishments and largely ignored properly established legal procedures. Hitler, in this regard,
established the People’s Court in April 1934 and had it composed of a five-judge panel, only two of
whom qualified as judges based on older standards. In this way, the court was transformed from an
institution that guarantees a historically and instersubjectively process of justice for one that, according to
Court Attorney Friedrich Parey in 1937, was a “task force for combating and defeating all attacks on the
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external and internal authority of the Reich.”135 Its purpose was later even more clearly defined by senior
prosecutor Heinrich Parrisius as a mission to “annihilate the enemies of National Socialism,” removing all
pretense that court was anything other than an extension of the Nazi party.136 In this way, party politics
permeated all levels of society, including traditionally protected procedural means of achieving justice.
Problems associated with infighting and improper procedure, according to Habermas, need to be
addressed by discourse theory under which “the source of legitimacy includes, on the one hand, the
communicative presuppositions that allow the better arguments to come into play in various forms of
deliberation, and, on the other, procedures that secure fair bargaining conditions.”137 This extends to all
forms of life. Social actors engage most effectively when they are amenable to being persuaded and
changing their mind, whether through discourse or some other medium. It is an essential step in the
learning process.
Regrettably, the Nazis failed to take this into account as nepotism was favored over logic and
sycophants were given preference over those most capable of engaging in dialogue. This was the standard
clearly at play when in 1938 Hitler replaced the well educated and trained Konstantin von Neurath as
foreign minister with Joachim von Ribbentrop, a much more sycophantic supporter, whose incompetence
would help push Germany towards war.138
Similarly, Hitler persecuted artists. At the Nuremberg Party Rally on September 1, 1933 he
expressed that it was time for a new German art claiming that the regime “leads ineluctably to a new
orientation in almost every area of peoples’ life,” thereby claiming that art needed to reflect the racial soul
of the people.”139 This meant rejecting any Jewish and so-called “decadent art,” particularly the work of
modern artists who might not be associated with the strict neo-classism associated with the regime.140
Thousands of more contemporary works were sold or destroyed, depriving the populace of an opportunity
135

Müller, Ingo. Hitler's Justice: The Courts of the Third Reich, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1991), 142.
Müller, Ingo, Hitler's Justice, 142.
137
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 278-79.
138
Evans, Richard J. The Third Reich in Power, (New York: Penguin, 2006), 644.
139
Evans, Third Reich in Power, 168.
140
Evans, Third Reich in Power, 168.
136

71

to experience more abstract material that could possibly change their perceptions or influence them
aesthetically. Hitler was intent on depriving people of the opportunity to be influenced by outside work or
be moved beyond their current mindsets in a way that might not be consistent with the strict obedience he
demanded.
It is not only that there is a social imperative for collective action as a means to function more
effectively, but also that such a social cohesion in turn promotes empathy and understanding. According
to Habermas, “actual participating in political action, deliberation, and conflict may make us aware of our
more remote and indirect connections with others, the long-range and large-scale significance of what we
wand and are doing.”141 Habermas believes this gives individuals a chance to internalize what they gain
from relating to others and “get a clear sense of commonalities, a sense of who he is and would like to
be.”142 True self-reflection can only come about once somebody has immersed themselves among others
from whom they gain the insights necessary for self-correction and betterment.
Such a principle was untenable in a Nazi empire in which many lost sight of their own role as
participator in a democratic process and were instead bound by absolute duty to a single racial ideology, a
concept the Nazis believed in so strongly that they attempted to inculcate it in children in a process of deChristianization. For the Nazis, Hitler’s beliefs were so overpowering that they superseded faith and
religious tradition that people had maintained for generations. The Nazis were so committed to elevating
Hitler to a position above the Christian God that they taught songs in schools that explicitly called for a
rejection of Christianity and an embracement of Hitler. One such song that was sung by the Hitler Youth
in 1934 in Nuremberg contained the lines “We don’t need any Christian truth/ For Adolf Hitler, our
Leader/ Always is our interceder”.143 Such a blatant disavowal of Christianity was coupled with a
concomitant, although not always successful, attempt by the Nazis to undermine Christian youth
organizations for with Nazi counterparts. Their single-mindedness prevented them from recognizing the
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significance of a religion that had a strong historical tradition in Germany and from which many Germans
gained an identity, not to mention any messages of empathy and understanding that Christianity
promotes.
Furthermore, according to scholar, Doris Bergen, German Christians, in order to maintain their
faith and opportunistically participate in the regime, were also complicit in promoting the racial message
of the Third Reich. According to Bergen, “The German Christians intended to build a church that would
exclue all of those deemed impure and embrace all “tre Germans in a spiritual homeland for the Reich.”144
This movement was called the “people’s church” (Volkskirche) and was “not an assembly of the baptized
but an associationg of ‘blood’ and ‘race.’”145 Often times to avoid being persecuted, religious Christians
in the Third Reich were still culpable for promoting the exclusionary messages of the Nazi Party.
The way to develop these insights involves communicative freedoms that “call for the legal
institutionalization of various forms of communication and the implementation of democratic
procedures.”146 This requires a facilitation of those institutions that facilitate education and an increased
capacity to engage in well-informed and lively dialogue. Universities figure prominently in this concept.
Given the Hitlerian military prerogative and wholesale rejection of non-“Aryan” ideas, universities
faltered during the Third Reich. The education of Jews was quickly outlawed and access to others was
severely limited once Hitler came to power. In April of 1933 the regime implemented the Law against the
Overcrowding of German Higher Education Institutes that declared that only fifteen thousand of the fortythousand grammar students who were expected to pass the school graduation exam in 1934 would find
places in German universities.147 As opposed to previous eras when most of the students could find
positions, acceptance after Hitler was very difficult. At the same time, they stimulated opportunism
among professors by favoring those who offered theories in favor of territorializing Eastern Europe.148
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This way they could ensure that communication was not only limited but the little that existed favored the
Reich. Many Nazis saw as a threat the very education that could have opened up new lines of
communication in Germany that would have saved them the horrible tragedy they experienced in WWII.
Because of the severe limitations placed on speech by the Nazis, teachers of elementary students
had to be very careful that they did not openly express any sentiment that could be taken to be an affront
to the Reich. A 38-year-old teacher in the Ruhr region early on during the Third Reich inadvertently told
a joke she later realized could be interpreted as anti-regime and was devastated when a begrudged student
told his parents. They denounced the teacher to the Gestapo who eventually had the teacher imprisoned
and fined.149 Usually allowed to speak more freely, teachers saw their normal prerogative heavily
restricted under the Third Reich and their ability to educate curtailed.
Curtailments of rights like these could be implemented when the traditional byways for ensuring
the protection of democratic opinion had been violated. The public protects its right to speech and
engages in communicative power, according to Habermas, “only after it passes through the filters of the
institutionalized procedures of democratic opinion and will formation and enters through parliamentary
debates into legitimate law making.”150 Free speech is then necessarily instantiated through institutions
that guarantee that the various views of its constituents will be acknowledged and considered. Without
these institutions, such communicative power is lost.
Most citizens of the Third Reich had no formal means by which to influence politics after the
transformation into a rubber-stamp body of the Reichstag, the German legislative body, and the removal
of political parties. Shortly after appointing Hitler Chancellor of Germany in January 1933, German
President Paul von Hindenburg gave Hitler the power he had refused former Chancellor Kurt von
Schleicher only four days previously, the ability to dissolve the Reichstag.151 Hitler was allowed to call
for new elections during which Communists were systematically excluded. Such conniving allowed Hitler
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to assemble a legislature more amenable to his views and with an approval of 444 votes to 94, to pass the
Enabling Act on March 23, 1933 that gave the Cabinet under Hitler’s leadership the power to enact laws
without the approval of the Reichstag.152 Thereby, traditional procedural outlets meant to ensure
democratic and republican consent were bypassed and the communicative power of the state became
severely limited.
Furthermore, the Nazi leaders also failed to receive moral justification for their practices based on
contemporary post-metaphysical notions of legitimacy. That is, according to Habermas, “the coercive law
tailed for the self interested use of individual rights can preserve its socially integrating force only insofar
as the addressees of legal norms may at the same time understand themselves, taken as a whole, as the
rational authors of those norms.”153 Habermas believes that only in this way can a unique “solidarity”
between citizens be established that effectively integrates all actors into the decision making process.
The Nazis violated this dictate by engaging in semi-religious and manipulative speech to induce a
sense of duty and obligation to the country and the “Aryan” race. They wanted citizens who abided
diligently by a Nazi code imposed by the government without communal dialogue and without redress for
offenders. They were so stringent as to violate almost every otherwise normally protected institution
including marriage. In 1935, as part of the Nuremberg laws, the Nazis passed the Defense Law that
banned mixed marriages between German soldiers and non-“Aryan” women that they justified as
necessary to prevent threats of “race traitors.”154 Relatively early on in the establishment of the empire,
they felt it imperative to establish strict boundaries on who people could choose to marry. They denied the
rationality of their citizens and instead imposed their own concepts coercively through legal mechanisms
generally associated with furthering human dignity and independence. In this way, they enforced their
own mentality and refused to acknowledge the need for a more normative morality in a process of
gradually radicalized racism.
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This practice was more brutally applied to the Poles whose “slightest signs of
insubordination…were regarded by the courts as threats to German rule, and every expression of Polish
national pride was treated as a crime.” Laws were passed, such as Section 1, paragraph 3 of the Decree on
Criminal Justice (December 4, 1941) that allowed the regime-controlled courts to punish any acts they
considered “inflammatory” or “malicious” towards the empire without specifying what those were.
Basically, this meant any slightly derogatory remark could be met with a concentration camp or worse.
The law was often applied retroactively to Jews.155 Altogether, they amounted to a wholesale rejection of
people as authors of their own norms.
Furthermore, once subjects choose to engage politically, they need to be ensured protection. In
Habermas’s opinion, it is important that the judiciary “be separated from the legislature and prevent from
programming itself.”156 This means that the judiciary should not have the power to help formulate the law
it is responsible for implementing. Rather, it must be compelled to follow existing law. Only under the
auspices of a firmly established and stable legal structure can the judiciary hand down properly
substantiated decisions.
This was not the case during the Third Reich when existing law was constantly changed to meet
the needs of the Reich. Legal protections became ephemeral and weak when they were not consistent with
Hitler’s mission to conquer Europe and annihilate Jews. Starting at the beginning of Hitler’s tenure,
judges were made to know that they were expected to disregard the Enlightenment principles of a
dispassionate judge based in formalistic thinking and instead maintain a “healthy prejudice” and “make
value judgments which correspond to the National Socialist legal order and the will of the political
leadership.” The concept of the Volk, or the German people, was heavily emphasized. Judges no longer
had to follow traditional legal dictates but were instead given the more restrictive responsibility of an
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“obligation to the main principles of the Führer’s government.”157 Traditional legal guidelines, like
everything else, were sacrificed in favor of policy that followed Hitler absolutely.
In practice this principle led to the implementation of the Nuremberg Laws as a means to legally
discriminate against Jewish people. Of the three 1935 Nuremberg Laws the one applied most broadly by
the courts was the Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor. Originally mostly
directed towards preventing marriages between Jewish men and “Aryan” women, this law became
increasingly expansive over time, eventually extending towards any sexual relationship between a Jew
and an “Aryan.” Eventually, the law reached the point at which it was applied retroactively, as in the case
of a German who was in a relationship with a Jewish woman, with whom he had not had sex for many
years but was punished based on conjectures about unhealthy sexual impulses. The courts took it to its
most extreme in 1939 when judges held that it could even be applied to kissing as a “dishonor to the
race.”158 Eventually, even the legal distinctions made in the law became entirely moot as it became
expedient for the Empire to punish any romantic or intimate connection shared between a Jew and an
“Aryan.” The courts so zealously pursued this goal that they totally disregarded established law and its
fundamental role as a maintainer of human dignity.
Legal institutions, like legislative ones, must also be based on “normative grounds for publicity
requirements that keep institutionalized opinion and will formation open to the information circulation of
general political communication.”159 In addition to detracting from the overall communicative power of
the state, oppressive policies have the added detriment of preventing justice. Only when the public is
fairly allowed to decide who is making decisions and whether they are just can they maintain the fairness
necessary to realize their normative potential.
Fair protections can certainly not occur under a regime that does not allow for fair elections.
Hitler conducted many extremely unfair elections. Some that stand out as particularly illegitimate were
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those held on 29 March 1936 just after Hitler chose to make the first grand aggressive and internationally
unsanctioned action that would eventually lead to a world war, the remilitarization of the Rhineland.
According to the Treaty of Versailles that ended WWI and placed restrictions and sanctions on Germany,
and the subsequent Locarno treaties signed in 1925, the Rhineland was not allowed to be remilitarized as
a means to keep the peace. Any such remilitarization was to be seen as a hostile act. Nevertheless, Hitler
boldly chose to violate this provision and sent the German Army back to the Rhineland on 7 March 1936.
He believed new Reichstag elections would confirm the legitimacy of his actions. Because the Enabling
Act had already disabled the legislative body, the election was entirely superficial. This did not stop the
Nazis from rigging the vote, however, as they used scare and incentive tactics and excluded other parties
on the ballots to ensure the Nazis received an overwhelming percent—98.9—of the vote.160 Later, in
April 1938 in a controlled plebiscite the Nazis received a whopping 99.7 percent approval rating of the
Anschluss of Austria.161 Such actions demonstrated the spuriousness of the entire election process and
spoke to the public’s inability to engage use its communicative power to enhance government.
Democracy involves a level of complexity for which the Third Reich could not account.
Habermas defines the democratic principle as “the level at which interpenetrating forms of argumentation
are externally institutionalized.”162 This of course necessitates dialogue and a respect for the ideas of
others. Hitler had no respect for such complexity. He reduced his subjects to a mass of idiots, labeling
them “primitive in attitude and understanding” and believing that like him their only true motivation was
hatred.163 By not respecting his subjects he released himself from any obligation to listen to them and
allow more democratically based institutions to come to fruition. He oversimplified society by basing it
on a single ideology instead of permitting the organic growth of new ideas and manners of
implementation.
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Similarly, Nazi ministers under Hitler’s control were duplicitous and manipulative in the way
they carried on negotiations with other powers. Instead of implementing a nuanced and diplomatic
strategy whereby they relied on the experience of trained envoys and experts to maintain the peace and
promote mutual well being with other counties, they instead lied and cheated and undermined
international confidence in Germany’s ability to keep its word and attempt to maintain the peace. Despite
the fact that he had come to and maintained power largely by attacking Communists, Hitler had no trouble
concluding a treaty and non-aggression pact with the Russian Bolsheviks through the RibbentropMolotov Pact in August 1939 when it was expedient for him. He wanted to ensure that he could invade
and occupy Poland without Soviet interference.164 He agreed to divide the country with Stalin and in so
doing could fulfill his murderous and imperialistic impulses to further territorialize Eastern Europe.
Nevertheless, Hitler had no moral or political qualms about violating the treaty when he wanted
to continue his great conquest of Europe and was not making headway in his plans on a major invasion
against the British. In addition to wanting to preempt an alliance between the Soviet Union and the Allied
Powers, a potentiality that at the time was actually not immediately dangerous, Hitler’s main incentive
was to continue his quest for megalomaniacal control of Europe. He was unconcerned with protecting a
peace he had promised to keep when the conditions were such that he could no longer perpetuate his
single-minded and solipsisticly formulated plan to conquer Europe. Therefore, he planned for and
implemented Operation Barbarossa, an attack on the Soviet Union that began on June 22, 1941.165 With it,
Europe would be plunged into its most violent and deadly conflict. Hitler initiated the world’s most
destructive conflict because he was following a simple and personal initiative that entirely disregarded the
necessary complexity and nuance of any well-run democratic system.
To understand why communicative action is so important for the establishment of a strong moral
base, one needs to take into account its transcendent and idealizing foundations. Fundamentally, the
theory is intersubjective. This means that it is not a source of prescriptions issued by one person or a
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small plutocracy or party regime. Rather, according to Habermas, “it has normative content only insofar
as the communicatively acting individuals must commit themselves to pragmatic presuppositions of a
counterfactual sort.”166 They must be able to rise above the particularities of their own manners of
thinking and acknowledge transcending validity claims or the idea that what is better for a group of
people will in turn be what is best for each member within that group. This becomes more understandable
based on Charles Sanders Peirce’s theory of “the world as the sum of possible facts is constituted only for
an interpretation community whose members engage, before the background of an intersubjectively
shared lifeworld, in processes of reaching understanding with one another about things in the world.”167
Before one can really fathom communicative action, one needs to take a step back and realize that actions
and interpretations are constituted by what one have learned as members of a community that is
responsible for background concepts. Thereafter, it is necessary that people make idealizations as a
community that rise above anything they could have construed individually. Like components of a more
complex machine, people function most effectively when their actions are coordinated according to the
dictates of what is best for society, an idea that can only be arrived at collectively from the ground up
through dialogue, not imperiously imposed upon people from above.
This makes it important for a government to attempt to instigate open dialogue with its
constituents. When it gives messages, they should be factual and pertinent. Only in this way can leaders
draw upon societies’ collective idealizing power to come to realizations that would not have been
otherwise possible. The Third Reich leaders were entirely inconsistent in the manner in which they
engaged their citizens. Rather than choosing to open up avenues for constituent participation, they
dictated policy in a top down approach as a means to channel peoples’ basest and most depersonalized
emotions. This tendency was applied particularly insidiously in speeches made by Hitler in February
1942, in which he escalated anti-Jewish messages to call explicitly for extermination. Goebbels, after
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hearing the speeches, remarked, “The Führer wishes to expel the Jews from Europe absolutely.”168 Robert
Ley, the leader of the German Labor Front, concurred when he declared in a speech at the Sports Palace
in Berlin on February 2, 1942 that “Jewry will and must be exterminated. That is our holy mission. That
is what this war as about.”169 These speeches were some of the most bellicose calls for the elimination of
the Jewish people that occurred during the war, although there was little new added to the speeches as to
why this extermination must occur. What the speakers had in fact left out is that in January leaders of the
SS, Army, and other governmental and party offices had met in Wannsee, a Berlin suburb, to formulate a
“final solution” regarding the Jews that explicitly outlined the means by which they would be summarily
executed or worked to death, a fact that went unmentioned publicly during the speeches and throughout
the war. Thereby, the regime chose to act first and communicate with its citizens afterwards. Rather than
present their plans first in an attempt to elicit input, they instead attempted to legitimate its actions
retroactively and even then in a very surreptitious and underhanded manner whereby people were not
presented with facts and not allowed to participate in a dialogue.
More accurately, the Nazis, according to Habermas’s standards, “withdrew into an autopoietic
system, where law stands before the defamiliarizing socializing gaze and is stripped of all normative
connotations.”170 Such a set of laws for Habermas creates a “narcissistically marginalized law [that] can
react only to its own problems.”171 The laws during the Third Reich were so far removed from the input
of the general public that they in turn only fostered their own extension and became increasingly more
prosecutorial towards the people they were supposed to protect. It came to the point where if a Führer
decree was issued, it was expected that citizens follow it absolutely and without question regardless of the
consequences. The weakness of such a system became patently obvious as Hitler led thousands of soldiers
to their deaths on the Eastern Front by refusing to follow the advice of his generals. In 1942, Hitler
disavowed the advice given by Chief of the General Army Staff, Franz Halder, who was adamant in his
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refusal to commit wholeheartedly to the continued attacks on Stalingrad that were becoming increasingly
suicidal due to lack of German resources and the continued improvement of Soviet tactics. Hitler, who
was incapable of accepting any criticism, replaced Halder with convinced National Socialist General Kurt
Zeitzler, who continued the attacks that would eventually result in heavy German loses, the near
decimation of the German Sixth Army, and the eventual abandonment of Stalingrad.172 In this way, the
Nazi cult of the Führer was extended without any consideration of its normative foundations, which
resulted in thousands of unnecessary deaths of German soldiers and perpetuated the “sociological
disillusionment” of the empire.
These policies were decidedly illegitimate. To become valid, legal norms need to “harmonize
with moral norms… [in] an authentic self understanding of the legal community the fair consideration of
the values and interests distributed in it, and the rational choice of strategies and means in the pursuit of
policies.”173 Only when legal norms and moral norms are combined can human rationality be effectively
and legitimately used in the pursuit of societal betterment. For Habermas, law should be thought of in
terms of social integration that “takes place through the achievements of mutual understanding on the part
of communicatively acting subjects, that is, through the acceptability of validity claims.”174 Ultimately,
the Nazis, because of their ultimate deference to Hitler’s directives, failed to leave room for the mutual
understanding that would eventually lead to validity.
In lieu of including people in dialogue, the Nazis had to deliberately manipulate their subjects in
order to justify their actions. Hitler, in addition to being culpable for the unnecessary loss of millions of
lives in battle, was also responsible for assigning blame to others for German military defeats. In May of
1944 Hitler ordered that the Crimea be held despite persistent advice from military leaders, including the
commanding officer in the region, General Erwin Jaenecke, that doing so would be suicide. Nevertheless,
Hitler’s orders were carried out, resulting in the loss of an additional 60,000 German lives in the region.
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Instead of atoning for his mistake, Hitler placed the blame on Jaenecke and the other generals, labeling
them weak and defeatist.175 By doing so he revealed his total incapacity to take responsibility for his
leadership, an absolute necessity in any legitimately governed state.
Of course such policy also leads to internal infighting as actors attempt to distinguish themselves
from one another in a reckless pursuit for power and authority. One sees this tendency in the formation of
interpersonal alliances during the Third Reich in which major figures joined with others in an attempt to
undermine their competitors. One such noteworthy alliance occurred between Propaganda Minister
Joseph Goebbels and Hitler’s Secretary Martin Bormann against long-time second in command Herman
Göring and Armaments Minister Albert Speer. In 1944, as Nazi leaders desperately conscripted more men
to the war effort, Goebbels and Bormann used their personal connections with Hitler to subvert Göring
and Speer’s efforts to have the men assigned to producing arms and instead advocated they be placed in
the field. Furthermore, they solidified their personal access to Hitler while decidedly hindering Goring’s
and Speer’s access.176 Instead of attempting to facilitate cooperation and dialogue amongst the arguably
four most powerful men in the Reich under Hitler, they generated competition and antagonism.
Hitler’s extreme solipsism would have severe consequences on the Germans’ ability to maintain
production during World War II when those employed or coerced in producing food and manufactured
materials refused to complete and abandoned their work. According to Habermas, in order to maintain a
productive and functional system of labor and economy, a society must be structured on legitimate law.
Legitimate law, in turn, “is compatible only with a mode of legal coercions that does not destroy the
rational motives for obeying the law: it must remain possible for everyone to obey legal norms on the
basis of insight.”177 In order for people to be motivated to be contributing members of society, they need
to understand that by doing so they contribute to their own well-being. This is not a possibility in a slave
society. Slavery is irreconcilable with an active and organically self-perpetuating economic system.
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The untenability of the Third Reich’s slave based economy was illustrated with the staggering
number of escapees that occurred during the latter part of the war. According to Speer, in 1944 an
estimated half a million coerced laborers escaped, which is indicative of the fact that they were
unmotivated to stay but were also willing to risk their lives to avoid it.178 It indicates that an overextended
Germany was incapable of avoiding massive abandonment of the empire.
Inhibiting peoples’ abilities to apply their insights also had great military implications on the
German war effort as the exclusion of generals from the major decision making process led to many
German deaths. A particularly devastating decision Hitler made was to disregard the advice of General
Friedrich Paulus, the commanding general of the remaining German troops in Stalingrad, in January
1943. After the Germans had already endured a brutal winter and had been ravaged by hunger and
disease, Paulus recommended surrender, claiming it was the only way to save the remaining troops from
annihilation. Hitler did not capitulate and instead demanded they fight till the end, forcing the remaining
troops into two small areas of Stalingrad where they were nearly all eventually killed or captured.179 The
experience that military commanders had gained from their war efforts was disregarded by Hitler when it
was inconsistent with his plans for conquest.
Once people discontinue being authors of their futures, institutions concomitantly can no longer
be properly regulated. For Habermas, “the extent that institutionalized deliberation and decision making
loses contact with an uncoerced process of need articulation, it lacks parameters that it cannot generate of
its own accord.”180 At the end of the war, Germans expressed a general feeling of helplessness about the
destruction of their economy and their inability to change their abject prospects. One worker, on May 2,
1945, expressed it poignantly as he claimed, “Our Leader, who promised us so much, has achieved what
nobody in power in Germany has so far achieved. He has left behind a Germany that is totally destroyed,
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he had taken everyone’s house and home.”181 Once discourse was eliminated Germans were plunged into
uncontrollable chaos in which they had no outlet to articulate their needs and feelings and were instead
driven recklessly into the abyss. A girl in Germany who had initially believed in Hitler’s grandiose plans
understood it correctly when she expressed that Hitler’s assassination was the only chance for Germany’s
salvation.182 He became a disease and parasite on the decision making process that needed to be removed.
To harness this communicative power the growth of the public sphere must be complemented by
a concomitant development of private liberties, which, along with public autonomy, when made secure
create a system of rights that “operationalizes the tension between facticity and validity, which we first
encountered as a tension between the positivity and legitimacy of law.”183 Private people need to feel
responsibility for their destinies. Although the government is a super structure that imposes bounds on
peoples’ behaviors it is still only a facilitator of people working to collectively achieve their own
individual potentialities. It became blatantly clear, particularly near the end of WWII, that the Third Reich
did not allow people to pursue their own destinies. Despite the pervasive suffering that German citizens
experienced and their attempts to save themselves from total destruction at the end of the war, Hitler
maintained that they should all be annihilated if they were not resilient enough to complete their mission
of taking control of Europe. Even facing total defeat and the imminent invasion of Berlin, Hitler, in his
last public declaration in 1945, maintained that Germany must under all costs wipe out “the Jewish
plague” and that the sole remaining purpose of the German people was to “make good what the
international Jewish criminal and their henchmen have done to our people.”184 Despite the fact that
Hitler’s police had already killed nearly two-thirds of Europe’s Jews and his policies had ravaged
millions, he maintained that people should not be allowed to focus on reassembling their lives. Private
autonomy was no longer an option, and if Hitler was unsuccessful in his mission, everyone had to suffer
the consequences.
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Habermas also believes the decision should left to subjects whether or not they want to focus on
themselves or engage politically. He claims that “participatory rights must be formulated in a language
that leaves it up to autonomous legal subjects . . . if they want to shift their perspective from their own
interests and success to mutual understanding and communicative freedom.”185 Subjects know best when
they necessarily must focus on personal details versus when they feel compelled to articulate their
viewpoints more broadly. By granting them their freedom, the government can ensure that they engage
publicly when their input is most applicable. Otherwise, they are imposed upon when the public sphere
becomes their obligation.
German citizens prominently displayed the weight of this burden at the end of the war. In March
1945, with a German defeat inevitable and people suffering as a result of Hitler’s reckless decisions,
many subjects nonetheless expressed sympathy for Hitler. One fifteen-year-old girl lamented in her diary,
“Our poor, poor Leader, he can’t be sleeping at night anymore, and yet he’s had Germany’s good on his
mind.”186 Having been raised in the Nazi educational system, the girl seemingly lacked an authentic
personal identity. Rather than express grief regarding her own circumstances and prospects for the future,
she was consumed with Hitler’s troubles. Despite Hitler having been directly responsible for the worst
catastrophe in Germany’s history she continued to express her admiration for a man who supposedly had
the country’s best interest in mind. She had been so inculcated in Nazi ideology that she could no longer
distinguish her own difficulties from the German mission established by Hitler.
The Nazi regime violated nearly all of Habermas’s distinctions and principles about how to
maintain validity and integrate it into the legislative and judicial process. By not doing so, it failed to
extract the communicative potential of the German community. Instead of harnessing the power of
intersubjective dialogue and legal growth, it regressively imposed arbitrary decrees from above in Hitler’s
egomaniacal pursuit of European domination. Resultantly, it was doomed to fail. Its total disregard for
normative verification ensured that it remained out of touch with its populace and did not serve their
185
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interests. Militarily, this caused devastation as Hitler pursued an unwinnable war. Economically, this
ravaged a land unable to sustain such a large and long conflict, and socially, this led to the persecution
and deaths of millions and the devastation of the spirit of a people who by the end of the war largely felt
helpless against defeat. This was an inevitability in a regime that failed to recognize that collective efforts,
legitimated normatively, always transcend those implemented by a totalitarian and ultimately ineffectual
government.
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The fascist Third Reich was a hierarchical authoritarian state that fundamentally violated the
notion of a liberal, rights-oriented and constitutionally based state associated with the development of the
modern western world. This equates to a rejection of the notion of normal historical social progress.
Rather than upholding the idea that the achievement of civil and constitutionally protected rights was
indicative of an increased ability of people to express their interests and collectively engage in dialogue as
a means to collaboratively better their conditions, Hitler imposed a totalitarian state where the ideology
propounded the notion that politics could function effectively under the auspices of an absolute leader and
single ideology whole-heartedly protecting their national, and in Hitler’s case, racial interests. Habermas
thinks this idea is regressive. His intellectual efforts are dedicated to establishing a theoretical framework
in which the singular interests of all citizens can be effectively addressed and respected in pursuit of
mutual interests. He believes understanding can only be achieved when citizens are allowed to use their
natural rational capacities to engage democratically and produce decisions based on the strengths of the
best arguments that reflect everyone’s interests. As opposed to the Nazis, he does not believe violence is
necessary for coordination. Rather, citizens can inculcate societal concepts into their own understandings
of the world in a gradual process of both personal and societal rationalization, a rationalization that he
associates with the modern intellectual development beginning since the Enlightenment.
Habermas’s writings can be seen as a means to project the intellectual tradition of Immanuel
Kant, Georg Hegel, and Karl Marx and their beliefs regarding modernity and enlightenment against the
encroachments of Friedrich Nietzsche and subsequent German philosophers such as Martin Heidegger
who arguably rejected some of the more democratic impulses of Kantian ethics in favor of more
subjective and creative form of expression. Nietzsche, a major opponent of Christian morality, spends
much time in his various books propounding the flaws of what he saw as a religion that promoted
weakness and mediocrity instead of a freer form of creativity. He disdained democracy and socialism
because he believed that they upheld Christian ideas about equality and worked against the more visceral
and creative impulses he thought were reserved for only the highest form of human being. Although
misunderstood by Nazis and other dictatorial movements, Nietzsche’s ideas regarding the supremacy of
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certain manners of living certainly lent itself to imperialistic impulses.187 It is in this light, according to
American political scientist Fred Dallmayr, that Nietzsche can be seen as having “initiated not only a
moderate counterpoint or counterdiscourse within the confines of Hegelian parameters but rather a radical
antidiscourse that no longer obeys the rules of enlightenment.”188 Habermas believes that this can be
associated with an “antihumanism [that] constitutes the real challenge to the discourse of modernity.”189
Therefore, Habermas seeks to protect Kant’s ideas regarding the importance of encouraging and
considering all opinions openly and empathetically. He wants to ensure that the ethical underpinnings of a
modern Western project to uphold individual rights and protect individual dignity are philosophically
substantiated.
To do so, he developed a philosophy around the idea that the sharing of knowledge through
dialogue, or communicative action, is a vital component of a stable and socially emancipated society.
Members of such a society participate democratically and are able to present their own arguments as well
as listening without prejudice to the arguments of others. This allows citizens to choose the overall best
arguments and incorporate them into their own understanding through a process of self-reflection and
criticism. Resultantly, people will approach future situations and dialogues with better understanding,
creating a dialectical rationalization of society, a concept similar to those used by Marx and Hegel.
However, such a system does not always naturally come to fruition. Although there has been a general
social rationalization of society since the Enlightenment, according to Habermas the Nazis reflect a total
relapse in social protections. Habermas therefore takes it upon himself to clarify how a quasitranscendental notion of ethics, where all opinions are respected, is necessary to ensure a continued
rationalization of society and the modern intellectual project.
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The extent to which he succeeds in protecting the notion of a universal interest in social progress
is debatable. Dallmayr believes Habermas went too far in his criticisms of Nietzsche and other
philosophers. He questions that while Habermas believes Nietzsche’s philosophy reflects an
“intensification of the subjective to the point of total oblivion” he also bases much of his philosophy on
subjectivism associated with self-reflection and individuation. Similarly, Dallmyr believes Nietzsche, and
many subsequent philosophers in his tradition, do not necessarily breach the point of rationality and
advocate the shift into a chaotic realm. Rather, he believes that starting from his first book, The Birth of
Tragedy, Nietzsche was always compelled by the strong tension that existed between more creative
impulses and rational capacities. Instead of advocating an abandonment of rationality, Dallmayr believes,
Nietzsche wants rationality to not become hypostatized or foundational but rather fluid and open to
experimentation. Nietzsche believes that knowledge must not be placed into eternal, indelible categories
but be used to fulfill more visceral and instinctive human needs.190 In this way, Nietzsche could be said to
be wedding knowledge to human interest even more than Habermas.
Nevertheless, what remains clear is that Nazi leaders during the Third Reich degraded the
condition of many of their subjects and constituted social regression. They used reason strategically and
insidiously to undermine their enemies and oftentimes each other in the pursuit of power and interest.
Hitler played his subordinates against one another, encouraging monstrous men, like Himmler, to take
such extreme measures as committing genocide to promote Hitler’s ideology and extend their own sphere
of interest. Similarly, Hitler was largely closed to outside suggestion and abandoned the interests of his
people, particularly at the end of the war, as he furthered internal privation and suffering in pursuit of an
unwinnable conflict. Justice did not exist in a state where individual rights and privileges were ignored
and bypassed in the interest of Nazi ideology. And although it may be true that Habermas unfairly
evaluates Nietzsche and those working in his tradition, what remains clear is that much of Habermas’s
thought is a direct response to injustices of the Third Reich.
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Democracy and constitutionalism are important cornerstones of the contemporary political world.
For many people they constitute the peak of human social progress in terms of fairness and equality. What
Habermas does is establish why they may also be the most socially progressive form of human
achievement based on how they increase our overall rationality and work to fulfill our interests. The Nazi
movement and government resulted in widespread suffering largely because it failed to meet these
interests. Even discounting its political and racial agenda, the Third Reich was organized in such a way
that it stifled the ability to draw on the individual intellectual contributions of its citizens in the process of
collaborative self-betterment. Habermas returns our attention to why, not just from a self-evident but also
from a foundational and theoretical standpoint, respect for individual opinion and freedom to engage in
open and self-determining dialogue is the most effective way to achieve social progress.
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